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Foreclosure By Power O f Sale: Securing a Proper 
Price in New Brunswick
JOSEPH T. ROBERTSON*
The author examines in four stages the process o f foreclosing by way of 
power o f sale with respect to securing a proper price in the Province of 
New Brunswick. The first stage outlines the nature and scope o f the 
obligations being imposed upon mortgagees and a critique o f the law as 
it now stands. The second stage compares the "standard o f care" bemg 
exacted with what is perceived to be the general sale practices adhered 
to in this province. The author maintains that the standard bemg imposed 
by law is not met by present practice and goes on to deal with a number 
of arguments which might be advanced to support an improvident sale.
The third stage examines the propriety of allowing a mortgagee to buy 
in at his own sale pursuant to the Property Act, while the fourth is 
directed at law reform.
L ’auteur fa it  une étude en quatre étapes examinant la procédure de 
forclusion en guise du droit de vente, et comment cette procédure y attache 
(au droit de vente) un prix adéquate pour la province du Nouveau- 
Brunswick. La première étape établit le genre et l'étendue des obligations 
imposées sur les créanciers hypothécaire ainsi qu'une critique de la Loi 
telle quelle aujourd'hui. Le deuxième stage dépeind une comparaison 
entre la diligence exigée et ce qu'on entend comme pratiques de ventes 
générales adhérées dans cette province. L'auteur entretien que ce stand­
ard imposé par la Loi n'est pas reçu dans la pratique courante, et de 
plus, il traite plusieurs arguments à l'appui d'une vente imprévoyante.
Le troisième itage examine la bienséance autorisant un créancier hy­
pothécaire de s ’approvisionner à sa propre vente conformément à la Loi 
sur les biens, tandis que la dernière étape prête attention aux lois de 
réforme.
INTRODUCTION
Ultimately a creditor may be faced with the realization that, in o rder 
to ensure the repaym ent o f a debt or the perform ance o f some other 
obligation secured by a m ortgage o f realty, it will be necessary to proceed 
against the land itself. In this respect, New Brunswick’s revised Rules o f 
C o u rt1 which came into effect on Ju n e  1, 1982, have narrow ed the available
*B. Com m ., 1972 (S.M .U.), LL.B., 1977 (U .N .B .), LL.M., 1978 (L ondon). Assistant Professor, Faculty of 
Law, University o f  New Brunswick.
'(N .B.) Reg. 82-73 enacted  u n d e r sections 73 and  73.2 of the  Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973.C.J-2, as am ended.
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rem edies by effectively doing away with the ability to proceed by way of a 
“foreclosure action.”2 This state o f aff airs does not arise because o f a specific 
rule but ra th e r by the Rules Revision Com m ittee’s decision to om it any 
procedural and substantive guidelines which could be utilized by such a 
secured cred itor in pursuing this rem edy.3 Notwithstanding this deliberate 
omission, it is conceivable that an action for foreclosure could be brought 
although it is probably m ere academic speculation to suggest such action 
given the fact that this process o f liquidating a secured debt had fallen into 
disuse. T hus, the power o f sale invariably provided for in the m ortgage 
docum ent, when used in conjunction with the statutory provisions found 
in the Property A ct*  can now be classified as the m ortgagee's penultim ate 
remedy. In the event that the property  is sold for an am ount less than that 
o f the ou tstanding indebtedness then, as a m atter o f last resort, there is 
always an action on the personal covenant for a deficiency.'’
It is, however, the power o f sale as utilized in the Province o f New 
Brunswick that will be the focal point o f this article; a rem edy which can 
justifiably be term ed unique when com pared with its use in o ther common 
law jurisdictions. T h e  fact that a m ortgagee can buy in at his own auction 
sale for his own purposes," as though he were an independent th ird  party, 
may be viewed with alarm  if not astonishm ent by those unfam iliar with 
New Brunswick law. At the same time, it appears that the New Brunswick 
sale process is envied for having evolved to the point where the procedures 
cannot be characterized as time consum ing or costly.7
Adm ittedly, such characteristics can be viewed positively, at least from 
the perspective o f secured creditors, but it is the opinion o f this writer; (1)
-T he te rm  "foreclosure  action" is used in the  sense that the  m ortgagee proceeds l>\ wa\ of an action 
com m enced bv a writ of sum m ons (now a Notice o f  Action). This p roced u re  leads to the m ortgagee obtaining 
a decree nisi and  in the  event the  m ortgage is not redeem ed within the allotted tim e than  a decree absolute 
(foreclosure absolute). T h e  right of an in te rested  party , including the d eb to r o r the  c red ito r, to request a 
sale in the  foreclosure proceedings is one found  in statute: e.g., hng land -l.au  of Property Act, 1923, 15 
Geo. V'.. c.20, s.91; O ntario-see  Rule 4H4. 467, and  470 o f the  Rules of C ourt w here the  court is given a 
general pow er to direct a sale. In  New Brunswick u n d e r the  “old rules" (O rd e r 56. Rule IS) a creditor 
could b ring  an action fo r foreclosure and  sale of m ortgaged prem ises. O rd e r  31. Rule 1 enabled  the  court 
to  o rd e r a sale.
X:ivil P rocedure  Rules Revision C om m ittee (B arristers’ Society of New Brunswick) Final Report — Max 
19SI at 39. While the  C om m ittee d id  consider the possibility of resu rrec ting  foreclosure proceedings, 
because o f  the pro tection  af fo rded  to a m ortgagor, it com  liulcd that any im balance could be In st rem edied  
bv am endm en ts to those provisions of the  Property Art. in/ra. footnote 4 yvhich govern the exercise of the 
power o f  sale.
'R .S.N.B. 1973. c.P-19, as am ended , here in a fte r re fe rred  to as the  Property Art.
'O n the  o th e r hand , the  right to sue on  the  covenant for paym ent a fte r having obtained an o rd e r for 
foreclosure absolute is ex tinguished unless the  m ortgagee is in a position to leconvev the  land; l.ockhart \ . 
Hards (1846). 9 Beay. 349 at 357; and  see generally Hushton \ hulustnal Development Hank. [ 1973) S.( . R 
552 at 562; (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 582 at 589 w herein Laskin ]. (as he then  was) conveniently sum m arizes 
the law on  this point.
"Subsection 44(4) of the  Property Art provides ilia! the  power given to  m ortgagees to buy in at an auction, 
pu rsuan t to subsection 44(1), is a |x»wer to buy in fo r its oyxn lienefn and  its own use.
"Civil P rocedure  Rules Revision C om m ittee (B arristers ' Society of Nex\ Brunsyvick) Final R eport, supra. 
footnote 3 at 39.
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that the liquidation process, entailing adherence solely to the term s of the 
m ortgage contract and the provisions o f the Property Act, affords no pro­
tection to m ortgagors o r owners o f  the equity o f redem ption with respect 
to securing a “p ro p e r price” on a disposition u n d er the power; (2) that 
such a practice may in fact expose this secured creditor to liability on the 
basis o f a failure to take “reasonable precautions” in attem pting to obtain 
a p ro p er price notw ithstanding strict compliance with any statutory p ro ­
visions and; (3) that the practice o f the m ortgagee buying in at a sale for 
his own purposes and then suing for a deficiency, is open to serious criticism 
given the m arketing techniques normally adopted when selling under a 
power o f  sale.
T his article will exam ine the foregoing issues in four stages. T h e  first 
will outline the natu re  and scope o f a m ortgagee’s obligations o r duties 
with respect to securing a p ro p e r price when exercising a power o f sale as 
imposed by courts o f equity and, provide a critique o f the law as it now 
stands. Ih e  second will com pare this so-called “standard  o f care” with what 
the writer believes to be the present sale practices (compliance with the 
provisions o f the Property Act and m ortgage docum ent) generally adhered  
to in the Province o f New Brunswick. This com parison necessarily entails 
a determ ination to w hether the standard  being imposed by law is, in fact, 
met by the present practice. Given that the writer adopts the position that 
this is not the case, then it is incum bent to deal with those argum ents or 
defences which may reasonably be proffered  in support o f  the claim that 
it is only obligatory to adhere to the provisions o f the Property Act and the 
m ortgage docum ent. T he  th ird  stage will exam ine the uniqueness and 
propriety o f perm itting a m ortgage to buy in at his sale for his own purposes 
given the prices which are apparently  being paid. T h e  concluding segment 
will be directed at suggestions for reform  within this area o f m ortgage law.
THE DUTY OWED BY A MORTGAGEE 
Case Law
W hen one speaks o f the rights o f a m ortgagee to sell the property  o f 
his debtor upon default without the latter’s concurrence, and rem oved from 
the paternalistic jurisdiction o f the court, it is inevitable that one would 
wish to establish the concom m itant obligations or duties assum ed by the 
form er with regard  to the precautions that must be taken in anticipation 
o f a sale and the ultim ate price to r which property may be disposed. Perhaps 
these issues would be o f less significance du ring  a time o f economic pros­
perity because o f the ease with which property  could be sold at a price 
reflecting its m arket value. However, given the dram atic fluctuations in 
interest rates over the past twelve m onths,8 accepting the political predic­
tions as to the large num ber o f Canadian hom eowners that will supposedly
"A nywhere from  139? lo 219?.
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lose their homes if m ortgages are renewed at unprecedented  high rates9 
and assum ing that in the real est?*,. ».-nrket there may well he a notable 
absence of those who would "Oimallv be in “rested in becoming property 
ow ners,10 the m atters raised take on a m ore sei ous aspect. Yet the principles 
to the applied will rem ain unchanged in either of these economic climates.
Initially, any attem pt to delineate the obligations to be subsum ed by a 
m ortgagee when exercising his power o f sale tu rned  on the characterization 
o f the m ortgagor-m ortgagee relationship. This characterization process 
took on the form  o f a trust analogy whereby the m ortgagee was called 
upon to em brace the duties and responsibilities as though having been 
appointed a trustee. Accordingly, the issue pertain ing to the duty o f a 
m ortgagee was spoken o f in term s o f the following questions. Is the m ort­
gagee a trustee o f the power o f sale and thus encum bered with the duty 
of adhering to the “standard of care" as though acting as a fiduciary vendor," 
or is this secured cred itor only a trustee o f any surplus proceeds that may 
be realized once a sale is consum ated? T o  m aintain that a m ortgagee is a 
trustee who must exercise the power as would any p ruden t man o f business 
intimates that there  is a lower standard  which is o r can be adhered  to 
without fear o f  legal reprisal. T h e  judicial controversy over the issue o f 
p roper characterization was resolved at an early stage by answering the 
first part o f  the question in the negative and thus the question was sub­
sequently reform ulated . Is a m ortgagee, when exercising a power o f sale, 
merely un d er a duty to act in good faith, o r in addition to that obligation, 
is he un d er a duty to take reasonable precautions in o rder to obtain what 
might be described as a “p roper price”? U nfortunately, the answer to this 
question has been bantered about in the law reports even though the right 
to utilize a power o f sale was given judicial sanction as early as 1802.12 In 
a relatively recent decision o f the English C ourt o f Appeal, Lord Cairns 
succintly and accurately assessed the state o f  the Law (prior to the decision 
rendered  in that case);
1 hnd it impossible satisfactorily to reconcile the authorities but I think the
balance o f  authority is in favour . .
9D uring  p repa ra tion  o f  this article the interest ra te  charged  b\ Banks d ro p p ed  from  21% to 13%. Should 
the ra te  increase over the next few vears then  the  problem  will once again be acute.
l0In light o f the  fac that the  federal governm ent has instituted a $3.000 grant p rogram m e, available to
first tim e hom e purchasers  and  those buying new hom es, these rem arks a re  to  be- tem pered . As well, at 
the tim e of writing, all th ree  provincial parties in the  Province of New Brunswick adop ted  "m ortgage 
interest relief" as a p latform  prom ise when cam paigning for the 1982 O ctober election.
" T h e  s tandard  o f  care requ ired  of a trustee was fo rm ulated  by l.o rd  B lackburn in Speight v. (jaunt (1883), 
9 App. ('.as. 1(H.L.) at 19: "as a general ru le a trustee  sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes in m anaging 
trust affairs all those precau tions which an o rd in a ry  p ru d en t m an of business would take in m anaging 
similar affairs o f  his ow n.” As to the  effect o f  statutory provisions governing the equitable ru le see D.W.M.
W aters, Law o f T rusts  in C anada, (Carswell, 1974) at 685 et seq. and  note 67.
»Clay v. Charpe (1802), 18 Ves. 346, 34 E.R. 348.
15Cuckmere ttnck Co. Ltd. v. M utual Finance Ltd., [1971) 2 All. K.R. 633 at 653. A similar observation was 
m ade by Lord Salm on: “it is impossible to p re ten d  that the state of the authorities on this branch of the 
law is entirely  satisfactory" at 643.
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T h e  enigm atic problem  o f balancing the authorities is only perpetuated 
when reference is had to such a work as Falconbridge on Mortgages o r for 
that m atter Halsbury's. M Any historical analysis which attem pts to reconcile 
either the English or C anadian authorities, or both, on this issue is bound 
to ru n  afoul o f Viscount H aldane’s perceptive rem arks—“the consideration 
o f cases which tu rn  on particular facts may be useful for edification, but it 
can rarely yield authoritative guidance”.15 At the same time, it would be 
remiss not to exam ine those decisions which have given rise to the confusion 
with respect to the required  standard  o f care (good faith or good faith and 
reasonable precautions) and those cases which are most often cited as au ­
thority for either proposition. T h e  source o f the debate is found in three 
decisions o f the English courts rendered  between the years 1888 and 1897.
T h e  first o f these is Farrar v. Farrar's Lim ited,n' a case in which three 
co-mortgagees in exercising their power o f sale, sold the property to the 
defendant com pany in which one o f the co-mortgagees was a m inority 
shareholder. T he  plaintiff m ortgagors com m enced an action to have the 
sale set aside on the ground that a m ortgagee cannot sell to himself either 
alone o r with o thers.17 T he  C ourt o f Appeal in concluding that what had 
transpired  was not in law a sale to the m ortgagee but ra ther a sale to a 
distinct legal entity nevertheless held that the defendant was obligated to 
prove that the sale was not fraudulen t nor at an undervalue. W hen ex­
am ining the duties which a m ortgagee owes to the m ortgagor, Lindley L.J., 
delivering the judgm en t o f the court, stated:
A mortgagee with the power o f  sale, though often called a trustee, is in a very 
different position from a trustee for sale. A mortgagee is under obligations to 
the mortgagor, but he has his rights o f his own which he is entitled to exercise 
adversely to the mortgagor. A trustee for sale has r.ot business to place himself 
in such a position as to give rise to a conflict o f ir ’“rest and duty. But every 
mortgage confers upon the mortgagee the right tc his security and to
find a purchaser, if he can, and it in the exercise ■ power he acts bona fide 
and takes reasonable precautions to obtain a prop«., .ice, the mortgagor has 
no redress, even although more might have been obtained for the property if 
the sale had been postponed."1
l4See, Falconbridge O n  M ortgages (4th ed., bv W.B. R avner and  R H. M cLaren) at 734-735: H alsbury's 
(4th ed.) Vol. 32. par 726 at 333.
XbKreghngei v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company Limited. [1914) A C  25 at 40. 1 hese rem arks 
arose in the context o f a m ortgagor a rgu ing  that a collateral advantage which en d u red  past the da te  of 
redem ption  is void per se. His L ordship  discussed at length the historical reasons for the existence of the 
rule, but which he felt were no longer relevant.
I6( 1888), 40 Ch. D. 395 (C.A.).
17T h e  ru le  that am ortgagee cannot sell to himself w hen exercising the pow er is well settled: Downes v. 
Gazebrook (1817), 3 M er. 200, 36 E.R. 77; Robertson v. Xorris (1858). 1 Giff. 421. 65 E.R. 983; Mur,Ine \.  
Theriault (1898), 1 N.B. Eq. 588, King v. Keith (1898). 1 N.B Eq. 538. However, as previously noted the 
right o f  a m ortgagee to do  so is found  in s.44 o f  the Property Art. See text infra, footnote 116, w here this 
issue is dealt with in g rea te r detail.
l*Supra, footnote  16 at 410-411. A lthough not re fe rred  to in the  judgm ent an earlier English decision, 
Wolff v. Vanderzee (1869), 20 L.T. (N.S.) 353, held that a m ortgagee m ust take e v en  p roper precaution  to 
• secure the best price.
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On the facts, the court was satisfied that the defendant had taken all 
reasonable precautions to obtain a purchaser and, accordingly, had dis­
charged themselves o f the burden. At this point in time, the m ortgagee is 
perceived as a quasi-trustee who, is u nder a duty: to act bona fide: and to 
take reasonable precautions in o rder to obtain a p roper price. T h e  analogy, 
however, is curtailed by the lack o f any duty to postpone the date of con­
version so as to procure a better price.
A year later the C ourt o f Appeal in Tomlin v. Luce'" was confronted  
with a second m ortgagee claiming an account of all monies received by the 
first m ortgagee after exercising his power o f sale. T he issue in this case 
revolved around  the determ ination o f the am ount for which the trustee 
would be liable for having misdescribed the property to the purchaser 
ra ther than a determ ination o f  w hether o r not a duty o f care existed. T he 
“mistake” was rectified after the auction by an agreem ent between the 
m ortgagee and the purchaser whereby the sale price was reduced. At trial,-" 
the Farrar decision was followed and, on appeal, the court merely varied 
this ju d g m en t with regard  to the m ode in which the loss caused by the 
“mistake” o f (negligence) was to be calculated.-1 T hus, in addition to the 
obligations previously outlined, a m ortgagee must as well carry out his 
duties in a non-negligent m anner.
T h e  divergence in judicial opinion as to the duties o r obligations to be 
adhered  to when selling u n d er a power of sale stems from the respective 
decisions o f the English C ourt of Appeal and  the House o f Lords in Kennedy 
v. deTrafford .T2 H ere a m ortgage, given by two tenants in com m on, went 
into default. T h e  m ortgagee was advised by a surveyor that it was im­
probable that the property could be sold by public auction for an am ount 
suf ficient to pay the principle and interest and , accordingly, they proceeded 
to advertise the property for sale by way o f  private tender, which subse­
quently proved unsuccessful in attracting purchasers. Ultimately, one of 
the co-m ortgagors offered to purchase the property  for himself for the 
am ount o f principle and interest 011 the condition that the m ortgagee take 
back a m ortgage for a substantial part of the purchase price. T h e  m ortgagee 
agreed to do so provided that he could not obtain a higher price elsewhere. 
Unable to obtain such a price, the property  was sold un d er the power of 
sale to the co-m ortgagor on the basis o f  his offer. Subsequently, the trustee 
in bankruptcy o f  the o ther co-m ortgagor com m enced an action to have the 
sale set aside and for a declaration that a ligh t to redeem  the m ortgage 
existed. In the alternative, dam ages against the m ortgagee were claimed
'*(1889), 43 C h.D . 191.
*°( 1889). 41 Ch. I) 573.
2,T h e  loss was to  be calculated on the  d ifference between the  price realized and lliai which the  pro|K -m  
would have realized if there  had been no m isdescription a n d  uoi on  tlie- sum allowed .in ioiii|M-u>.iiion 
u nder the  agreem ent.
"[1896] 1 Ch. 762 (C.A.). a il 'd  [1897] A C. 180 (H I. ).
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on the basis o f  a failure to obtain the m arket value o f the property even 
though the price realized equaled the debt.
T he  plaintiff argued  that the sale should be set aside on the basis that 
his co-m ortgagor had fraudulently  contrived w ith the m ortgagee to exclude 
him from  any interest in the equity o f redem ption and that a co-m ortgagor 
cannot buy his own property  un d er the power o f sale." Both argum ents 
were rejected by both appellant courts as was the claim that the m ortgagee 
had acted negligently; a finding which could not be supported  in light of 
the efforts m ade by the m ortgagee to sell the property. More im portantly 
though, Lindley L.J. in the C ourt o f  Appeal, took the opportunity  to 
explain what he had m eant in holding that a m ortgagee had a duty to take 
reasonable precautions as form ulated in the Farrar case. O n appeal to the 
House o f Lords, Lord Herschell took the opportunity  to consider what law 
would reasonably expect o f a m ortgagee.
In the Court o f Appeal, Lindley L.J. capitulated from  his earlier po­
sition in the Farrar case by m aintaining that:
A mortgagee is not a trustee of a power o f sale for the mortgagor at all; his 
right is to l<x)k after himself first. But. he is not at liberty to look after his own 
interests alone and it is not right or proper, or legal, for him, either fraudulently. 
or willfully or recklessly, to sacrifice the property of the mortgagor: that is all.-'
On appeal to the House o f Lords, the decision o f the lower court 
already dealt with, was affirmed.-'' T he  judgm ent o f the court pertaining 
to the duties o f a m ortgagee was delivered by Lord Herschell:
M\ Lords. I am myself disposed to think that if a mortgagee in exercising his 
power of sale exercises it in good faith, without am  intention of dealing unfairly 
by his mortgagor, it would be very difficult indeed, if not impossible, to establish 
that he had been guilty of am  breach o f  duty towards the mortgagor. Lindle\
L.J., in the court below says that "it is not right or proper or legal for him either 
fraudulently or willfully or recklessly to sacrifice the property o f the mortgagor."
Well, I think that is all covered really by Ins exercising the power committed to 
him in good faith. It is dif fic ult to define exhaustively all that would be included 
in the words ‘‘good faith." but 1 think it would be unreasonable to require the 
mortgagee to do more than exercise his power of sale in that fashion.-*"
- 'In  the C.onii of Appeal the  a rgum en t " a s  advanced that .1 co-m ortgagoi cannot purchase the propertx 
on the  basis that a fiduciary re la tionship  existed Ix-tween these two debtors (see ibid.. k a \ L.J. .11 77."»-77<>). 
In the  H ouse of Lords the plaintiffs a rgued  that I lie co-m ortgagor who purchased  was 111 fa d  the  agent 
of the m ortgagee. ha\ ing c ollected ren ts fo r its < 1 ed ito r and  was the re fo re  noi alile lo pure hase the property 
(see. timi.. Lord H erschell al 1K7-INX). t he ru le being that a m ortgagee cannot sell to him self, his agent, 
o r a trustee.
-'.S' 11(1111. footnote 22 at 77*2.
-"’/Vi Lord H erschell: "Mv Lords. 1 confess I think this as hopeless an ap|>cal as lias ever lieen p resented  
to yom Lordships." \upin. footnote 22 at 183.
-".Sii/iiii. footnote 22 at IS.').
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Any binding effect that his ju d g m en t m ight have had on lower English 
courts was extinguished when his Lordship held firstly, that it was not 
necessary to exhaustively define the duties o f a m ortgagee and secondly, 
that even if this cred itor was bound to take reasonable precautions, he had 
done so.
T h e  issue as to the standard  o f care, for the most part rem ained 
undisturbed in England until 1971 at which time the C ourt o f Appeal had 
to deal once again with the natu re  o f the m ortgagee’s obligations.27 It is 
this case which has found judicial approval in New Brunswick and, th e re ­
fore, deserves careful consideration. Before doing so, however, it would 
be m isleading not to re fer to th ree  decisions o f the Privy Council and a 
decision o f the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada in which the issue has been 
canvassed and which are often cited as authority  for either one standard  
or the other.
In the first o f the Privy Council decisions, N ational Bank o f Australia v. 
United H and-in-H and  tif Band o f Hope Co. et a t28 the court noted that if 
p roperty  were “sold at an undervalue owing to the want o f due care and 
diligence, the ord inary  reference to the m aster would be to charge the 
[mortgagees] with what but for their wilful negligence and default might 
have been received.”29 U nfortunately the latter part o f this statem ent raises 
a fu rth e r problem . Is the m ortgagee only accountable if he has been grossly 
as opposed to being merely negligent as indicated in the form er statem ent? 
A partial answer is found in a decision o f the Privy Council rendered  some 
thirty years later.
In M cHugh  v. Union Bank o f Canada30 the Privy Council was called upon 
to consider the trial judges assessment o f dam ages arising from  the d e ­
fendant c red ito r’s sale o f certain horses given as security u nder a chattel 
m ortgage. Lord M oulton in affirm ing the decision o f the trial ju d g e  on the 
ground  that the conduct o f  the defendan t am ounted to negligence stated:
It is well settled law that it is the duty o f a mortgagee when realizing the mort­
gaged property by sales to behave in conducting such realization as a reasonable 
man would behave in the realization o f  his own property, so that the mortgagor 
may receive credit for the fair value o f the property sold.”
T he facts o f  this case, however, reveal that this statem ent was m ade in 
relation to the m ortgagee’s treatm ent o f the horses prior to the sale and 
not with regard  to the conduct o f  the sale, nor the precautions taken to
27T h e  Cuckmere decision, supra, footnote  13.
28(1879), 4 A pp. Cas. 391 — on  appeal from  the S uprem e C ourt o f  Victoria. 
»Ibid.. at 411-412.
*°[ 1913] A.C. 299.
"Ibul., at 311.
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realize a p ro p er price. In realizing upon his security the m ortgagee had 
driven the horses forty-five miles to the sale site in such a m anner that 
some o f the horses died while o thers were found to be in poor condition. 
This case is m ore analogous to those in which a m ortgagor has sought an 
accounting from  a m ortgagee o f realty who, prior to foreclosure o r sale, 
has taken possession and has failed to prevent the property  from  deteri­
orating o r is in fact the direct cause o f any dam age. What is the duty 
imposed upon a m ortgagee in such circumstances? Interestingly enough, 
the classic textbook answer to this question is that this creditor will only be 
liable for deterioration occassioned by his “gross o r wilful negligence”.3'2
T h e  last o f the Privy Council decisions, Haddington Island Quarry Co. 
Ltd. v. H udson ,33 involved an attem pt to have a sale set aside on the allegation 
that the m ortgagee had failed to use his “best efforts” to obtain the “best 
price”. T he  am ount eventually realized was inadequate so far as the m ort­
gagor was concerned. T h e  court concluded that even if these allegations 
could be sustained, that it would have no effect upon the purchaser unless 
collusion or want o f good faith on the part o f this third party could be 
shown. With regard  to the natu re o f the m ortgagor-m ortgagee relationship 
vis a vis the pow er o f sale, the court held that the latter is not a trustee o f ' 
the power and if the power is exercised in good faith the court will not 
in terfere even though the sale be at a disadvantageous price unless the 
price is so low as in itself to evidence a frau d .34 While the plaintiff m ortgagor 
argued  that the property  was worth at least $20,000 and therefore the sale 
price o f $8,259 being at a substantial undervalue, the evidence as to value 
given on their behalf was flimsy and accordingly the action was ultimately 
dismissed.
By the tu rn  o f the twentieth century the scales o f English justice fa­
voured a less rigid standard  o f care. Needless to say, the position espoused 
and adopted by C anadian courts in later years was no different. O f those 
decisions, the one cited most often is that o f  the Suprem e Court o f Canada 
in British Columbia Land Investment Agency v. Ishitaka.35 Here, the m ort­
gagor m ade the allegation that his p roperty  was sold at an undervalue 
because o f the failure to take steps to obtain the best price. A majority o f 
the Suprem e C ourt concluded otherwise. Following Kennedy v. deTrafford , 
D uff J ., stated:
[the mortgagee] is bound to observe the limits o f  the power and he is bound to 
act in good faith, that is to say, he is bound to exercise the power fairly for the 
purpose which it was given. If mortgagee proceeds in a manner which is cal-
,2See generally, Falconbridge O n M ortgages, supra., footnote  14 at 656 and H alsbury’s, supra, footnote  14. 
at par 702-704, 321-322. But see the  decision o f  Cross L. J. in the  l.uckmere case discussed, infra, at footnote
41.
” [1911] A.C. 722.
MIbtd., per Lord DeVilliers at 729, quo ting  Kav J . in Warner v. Jacob (1852) 51 L.J. ((ill) 642.
«[1911] 45 S.C.R. 302.
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culated to injure the interests of the mortgagor and if his course of action is 
incapable o f justification as one which in the circumstances an honest mortgagee 
might reasonably consider to be required for the protection of his own interests; 
if he sacrifices the mortgagor’s interests ‘‘fraudulently, willfully or recklessly”, 
then, as Lord Hershell says it would be difficult to understand how he could be 
held to be acting in good faith. But that is a vastly different thing from saving 
that he is under a duty to the mortgagor to take (regardless of his own interests 
as mortgagee) all the measures a prudent man might be expected to take in 
selling his own property. T he obligation o f a trustee, when acting within the 
limits o f  the power, would be no higher . . . and it is clear that in exercising his 
power the mortgagee does not act as trustee.“
These rem arks were m ade with respect to a sale in which the m ortgagor 
was m aintaining that he had offered to redeem  the m ortgaged property  
prior to the anticipated sale subsequently consum ated to r an am ount equal 
to one half o f its value. T h e  majority o f the court rejected the m ortgagors 
estimation as to value.37 Subsequent decisions o f o ther C anadian courts for 
the most part adhere to the good faith standard as stated by his Lordship 
when considering the obligations o f  a secured creditor with respect to a 
sale o f his security.38
T he need for reassessing the duty owed by a m ortgagee to its debtor 
arises as a result o f the position adopted in 1971 by the English C ourt o f 
Appeal in Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd. v. M utual Finance Ltd.™ T h e  plaintiff had 
borrow ed £50,000 from  the defendant on the security o f  a site com prising 
2.65 acres for which planning permission had been obtained for a devel­
opm ent consisting o f one hundred  Hats. Eventually the plaintiff ran into 
financial difficulty and was unable to proceed with the proposed devel­
opm ent. Meanwhile, planning permission had been obtained for a less 
costly undertaking, namely the construction o f th irty-three houses. Ulti­
mately, the plaintiff went into default and the defendants proceeded to 
exercise the power o f sale by en trusting  the property to estate agents who 
undertook advertising in national and local papers in anticipation o f the
M’lbid., at 316-317. Justices Anglin and  Davies reached the  saint- ton tlu sion . The Chief |u s tite  and  Id ington  
| dissented.
,:T h e  minority viewpoint was prem ised  on the  acceptance <>1 certain  la tts; for exam ple the Chief ju s ti te .  
in his dissent, held that the  property  yvas yvorth at least double the am ount at which it was o ffered  lot 
private sale (supra, footnote  35 at 305). C ontrary to this conclusion. Dull |. no ted  that there  was not a 
word in the evidence as to the yalue ol the properly at the date  ol sal«- (supia. footnote 3."). at 317).
HH\Vith respect to s.88 Bank Security [now s .179 of the Bank Act. S.C. 1980. c.40], see; (.anaditiit Imperial 
Hunk tif Commerce Hcppiier (1965), 52 W.W.R. (V S .) 295 at 302 (Sask. Q .B.); Hxing "I." Hunch Htuichinn 
Co. I.id. v. Toronto-Dominwn Hank (1976), 9 S lid . X: P.E.l. R. (XHd. C.A.) 209 at 219. With respect to a 
m ortgage of realty see; Kaiserhof Hotel (o . \ .  / .uhei (1912). 9 I) I K 877. 16 S.C.R. 651. a f fg  25 O.L.R. 
194 (C.A ). which aff'd  23 O .L .R . 481 (I)iv. C t.); Wilson y Taxloi (1912). 7 D.I. R 316. a fl’d 11 D.L.R. 455 
(Ont. C.A.). With respect to a chattel m ortgagee see; J  is  W. Investments Ltd. \ . Hlack el al. (1963), 41 W.W.R. 
577 (B.C.C.A.). T o  illustrate the  confusion m this area of the law see the judgm ent of Sheppard  |.A . in 
the latter case at 592, to the effect that the m ortgagor must prove that the  m ortgagee has acted in had 
faith and  that il the sales were properly conducted  the goods would have sold lot m ore. His L ordship  in 
tiling  both Lord Lindlev in the Farrai case and  Lord Herschell in the Kennedy deTraf/ord case found  
both to be com patible statem ents ol the  law. O n this point the head note of the case is dearly m isleading 
if not e rroneous.
wSupra , footnote 13.
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im pending auction. As well, posters were published and particulars o f sale 
were sent to land developers th roughout the country. Yet, any reference 
to the existence o f p lanning consent for one h u n d red  Hats was om itted. 
T he evidence, which was accepted by both the trial and appellate courts, 
established: (1) that developers considered land which is suitable for flat 
developm ent as being m ore valuable than land on which developm ent is 
restricted to the construction o f thirty-three houses and; (2) that because 
o f the omission from  the particulars o f  sale, this site did not come to the 
attention o f Hat developers who otherwise would have been attracted to it. 
Prior to the sale the defendants and the estate agents were inform ed o f 
these opinions but proceeded with the sale over the objections o f the plain­
tiff. T h e  estate agents m aintained the position, before and after the sale, 
that the land was unsuitable for developm ent with Hats. T he property  was 
sold un d er the power o f sale for £44,000 and  the plaintiff brought an 
action for dam ages on the basis o f  the defendan t ’s f ailure to take reasonable 
precautions. T he  plaintiffs adduced evidence placing the value o f the p ro p ­
erty at £65,000 and £75,000. At the request o f both parties, the trial judge 
fixed the price for which the site would have realized at £65,000.
Salmon L.J., noted that the state o f authorities on this branch of the 
law was not entirely satisfactory and concluded that a m ortgagee owes both 
duties; that is, to act in good faith and to take reasonable precautions to 
obtain a true  m arket value o f the m ortgaged p roperty  on the date on which 
he decides to sell it. I'hus his Lordship held that the defendan t’s insistance 
on proceeding with the sale without advertising planning permission for 
both uses constituted a failure to take reasonable precautions. In dealing 
with the Kennedy v. deTrafford decision his Lordship  seized upon the fact 
that Lord Hershell expressly refrained from  deciding the issue because of 
the finding that the m ortgagee in that case had , in any event, taken all 
reasonable precautions and thus technically his rem arks, being obiter, were 
o f no binding effect. With respect to the m ortgagee s duties, his Lordship’s 
analysis o f  the law clearly sets out recognizable param eters as to when a 
sale can take place:
Once the power has accrued, the mortgagee is entitled to exercise it for his own 
purposes whenever he chooses to do so. It matters not that the moment ma\ Ik- 
unpropitious and that by waiting, a higher price could Ik* obtained. He has the 
right to realize his security by turning it into money when he likes. Nor. in nn 
view, is there anything to prevent a mortgagee from accepting the l>est bid he 
can get at auction even though the auction is badly attended and the bidding 
exceptionally low. Providing none o f those adverse factors is due to am fault of 
the mortgagee, he can do as he likes.'"
In addition the court had to resolve two fu r th e r issues; the quantum  
o f dam ages and w hether the defendants were discharged of any liability 
by em ploying reputable auctioneers and estate agents. As to the form er, 
his Lordship held that since the m atter was not taken at trial, it could not
Ib id .. at t)43.
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be raised on appeal. As to the latter, the learned ju d g e’s findings of fact 
and assessment o f value were held to be unassailable.
Cross L.J. reaches the same conclusion with respect to the m ortgagee’s 
obligations, noting that if in the M cHugh  case a m ortgagee in possession 
can be liable for loss occurring through negligence it would be illogical that 
the m ortgagee’s duty should suddenly change when one comes to the sale 
itself.41 C ontrary to the conclusion reached by Salmon L.J., his Lordship 
held that neither the m ortgagee nor the estate agents were negligent in 
not advertising with respect to planning permission for flats. The fact that 
the estate agents adopted  the position that developm ent for such a purpose 
was not suitable and that any fu rth er advertising would have served no 
purpose am ounted to an e rro r of judgm en t and not negligence.42 On this 
point his Lordship was in the minority and accordingly, he went on to hold 
as did the th ird  ju d g e , that the trial judge, in any event, was wrong to 
accede to the request to assess the quantum  o f  dam ages on the basis o f  the 
evidence adduced.
T h e  last judgm en t delivered by Cairns L.J. conveniently and succinctly 
sets out the issues in the form  of seven questions with the appropriate 
responses. His conclusions may be sum m arized as follows: (1) the defend­
ants were un d er a duty to take reasonable care to obtain a p roper price; 
(2) failure to advertise w ithout reference to the planning permission for 
Hats am ounted to negligence and was not merely an e rro r of judgm ent 
although such an omission could not be considered reckless; (3) if it was 
negligent not to advertise the permission in the first instance, then it was 
negligent not to postpone the auction, and readvertise; (4) both the de­
fendant and their agents were liable; (5) that even if the fault was solely 
that o f the agents, it was not open for the defendants to argue on appeal 
that they were not liable the point having not been raised at trial; (6) that 
because o f the negligence the plaintiffs suffered dam age, that is, on the 
evidence the p ro p er inference was that a bid in excess o f £44,000 would 
have been marie and; (7) that the learned ju d g e  was wrong to accede to 
the request to assess the quantum  o f dam ages and the fairest course was 
to rem it thr* m atter to him as to the quan tum .43
Putting aside the issues as to dam ages and the liability o f a principal 
for the acts o f his agent, the court was at least unanim ous that the m ortgagee 
is under a duty to take reasonable precautions and to refrain  from acting 
negligently in carrying out this duty. Admittedly, the basis on which a 
distinction can be m ade between an act o r omission which will be deem ed, 
an e rro r of judgm ent, m ere negligence, o r gross negligence, is nebulous.
i llbtd., at 649. But see supra, footnote  32 and  p receding  text to the  effect that a m ortgagor is only liable 
for "gross negligence".
i2lbtd.. at 651.
"Ibid  , at 652-656.
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Although the House o f Lords has not had the opportunity  to adjudicate 
upon this issue, the Cuckmere decision has been applied by the New B runs­
wick C ourt o f  Appeal in Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce v. Haley.** This 
case involved the sale o f security taken u n d er s.88 [now s. 179] o f the Bank 
Act.45 T h e  plain tiff bank held an assignm ent o f a com pany’s inventory o f 
wood products and proceeded to sell the goods in an attem pt to extinguish 
the debt, only later to find it necessary to bring a deficiency action against 
the defendan t guarantor. O ne o f the defences pertained to the m anner in 
which the plaintiff had decided to sell the inventory, that is, the inventory 
was sold in haste only nine days elapsing after the Bank had taken pos­
session and without any effort to com m unicate with o r to sell to o ther 
com panies in the vicinity who were in the same business. T h e  evidence as 
to value accepted by both the trial and appellate court placed the total value 
at $31,000 and the forced m arket value (between 60% and 75% of the 
m arket value) at $19,000. T h e  inventory was sold for $5,900. After con­
cluding that a p ro p er dem and had been m ade on the defendant, contrary 
to the conclusion reached by the trial judge, and that it had failed to take 
reasonable precautions, the court then went on to assess the p lain tiffs claim, 
based on the outstanding indebtedness o f the company less the sum realized 
on the sale. T h e  deficiency claimed was reduced by $13,000, the difference 
between the latter sum and the forced m arket value. H ughes C.J.N.B. 
delivering the judgm ent o f the C ourt, when considering the obligations 
imposed upon this secured creditor, adopts the law as stated by Salmon 
L.J. in the Cuckmere decision in the following terms:
In my opinion, the law demands that a mortgagee, exercising a power o f  sale, 
owes a duty to the mortgagor not only to ref rain from recklessness and gross 
carelessness and without caring whether or not the interest o f  the mortgagors 
are sacrificed, but also to take reasonable precautions to obtain the true market 
value o f  the mortgaged property at the time he chooses to liquidate it; and the 
same duty is owed by a bank holding a s.88 security.4*
In the instant case, the basis o f liability on the part o f the bank was 
attributed to negligence in failing to contact o ther dealers in the lum ber 
and woodworking business who might have been interested in purchasing 
the inventory. His Lordship did go on to note that the plaintiff had not 
undertaken  any advertising and should not have acted so hastily even 
though some expense would have been involved in holding the inventory 
until a favourable opportunity  for its sale arose.
«(1978), 25 N.B.R (2d) 304.
45Supra , footnote 38, w herein reference is m ade to o th e r cases in which the  c red ito r held this particu lar 
type o f  security.
46Supra, footnote 44 at 313. In  so concluding , his Lordship  did  refer to an earlier decision o f  the C ourt, 
Bay Motors Co. Ltd. v. Traders Finance Corp. Ltd. (1959), 19 D.L.R. (2d) 331 (N.B.C.A.). l here  the  C ourt of 
A ppeal concluded that a m ortgagee was u n d e r a duty  to  act bona fide in exercising a pow er o f  sale undet 
a chattel m ortgage and  to  try to realize the  fair v^lue of the property . Rilchie J.A . based this conclusion 
on the general principles enunciated  in McHugh v. Union Bank, supra, footnote, 30; Kennedy v. deTrafford, 
supra, footnote 22; and  B.C. Land &  Investment Agency v. Ishttaka, supra, footnote 35. O ne decision often 
overlooked is tha t o f  the  New Brunswick C ourt o f Appeal in Cauvm  v. Dionne ( 1919), 51 D.L.R. 294 w herein 
Barry J. expressed  the  d ictum  that both duties were owed to the m ortgagor (at p. 302).
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A year later, in N ova Scotia Savings &  Loan v. M acK enzie,11 the Court 
o f Q ueen’s Bench o f New Brunswick applied the Haley case when holding 
that a m ortgagee o f realty owes both duties to his debtor. T he decision o f 
this court will be dealt with fully when considering the right o f a mortgagee 
to buy in at its own sale.
Defining — Good Faith/Reasonable Precautions
T h e aforegoing analysis has been restricted to a presentation o f the 
often quoted statem ents o f  law, contradictory as they might appear, per­
taining to the duty o f a m ortgagee. Admittedly, such an approach fails to 
provide guidance as to the conduct which constitutes acting in good faith 
or as to the natu re  o f the precautions which will be deem ed reasonable in 
attem pting to obtain a p roper price. Inasm uch as the judicial controversy 
usually centers on the duty o f  a m ortgagee to act solely in good faith, it is 
still necessary to circumsc ribe in concrete term s the natu re o f a m ortgagee’s 
obligations when so resti ted.
In this regard , lack o f  ̂ood faith is usually equated with acting either 
“fraudulently, wilfully o r re klesslv so as to sacrifice the property o f the 
m ortgagor”.48 Rather than dw ‘lling on those acts or omissions which amount 
to such conduct, the courts have found it m ore convenient to refer to the 
sacrificial aspects o f the sale, that is, *o com pre the am ount realized with 
the value49 o f the property. But at what point does the difference between 
these two figures am ount to a sacrifice o f  the m ortgagor’s equity o f re ­
dem ption? T he  classic statem ent is to the effect that so long as the m ort­
gagee acts in good faith the court will not in terfere even though the sale 
be at a disadvantageous price unless it is so low in itself to evidence a fraud. ’" 
N otw ithstanding the fact that such a response does not provide a definitive 
answer to the question posed, it does indicate that even if one has acted in 
good faith there is a point at which a sale must not be ef fected, otherwise 
it will be deem ed “frau d u len t”. On the o ther hand, it is clear in law that a 
sale cannot be attacked solely on the ground that the property was disposed 
o f at an undervalue.31 T h ere  appears to be no reported  decision in which
,7( 1979), 29 N.B.R. (2d) 7H (N.B.C.Q.B.).
,HPer Lord H erschell in Kennedy v. deTrafford, supra footnote 22 at 185: the  same explanation is given bv 
Duff j. in B.C. Land C? Investment Agencx v. Ishitaka. supra, footnote 35.
•‘‘Value is being used in the sense ascribed b\ H ughes C.J.N .B. in the Hates tase . that is. forced m arket 
value. H owever, see text infra with respect to the problem s in arriv ing  at such an evaluation
V)Supra, footnote 33 per Lord DeVilliers at 729 and p receding  text.
5,“1 d o  not consider, however, that that [a sale at an undervalue] in itsell is evidence of fraud. In niv 
judgm ent th e re  m ust be som ething far bevond the m ere fact of under-value" pei Crossm an |. in Waring 
v. London is  Manchester Assurance Co. Ltd... [1935] (Ml. 310 at 319. C anad ian  C ourts have adop ted  the  same 
position: e.g., L'ren v. Confederation Lije Assoc iation (1917), 40 O .L.R . .’>36 (H .C .).); Hoehn v. Marshall (1 9 IK), 
4ti D I R 149, 44 O .I..R . 241 (C.A.).
FORECLOSURE BY POWER OF SALE 97
a sale u n d er a power has been successfully attacked on the basis o f a 
disposition for a fraudu len t am ount. Yet this issue has arisen in another 
foreclosure forum ; namely, in an application for an o rder confirm ing a 
sale which has been held in a foreclosure action un d er the watchful eyes 
o f the court.
In Trust Loan Company o f Canada v. Lindquist et a lVJ the local m aster 
refused to confirm  a m ortgage sale held u nder an o rd e r o f the C ourt during  
the depression. T h e  m ortgagor was disquieted by the sale price o f $1,000 
and accordingly produced in evidence an affidavit o f a real estate agent 
who placed a value o f $4,800 on the property. T he  affidavit evidence 
tendered  by the liquidating cred itor was sworn by one o f its employees, an 
inspector o f farm  lands, who was o f the opinion that, given the economic 
climate o f the time, it was impossible to place a value on the land.53 T he  
court concluded that, in light o f  the fact that the m ortgagor had ample 
time in which to attem pt to sell the property, although to no avail, the price 
realized was not so low as to be in itself evidence o f fraud and, accordingly, 
the sale ought to be confirm ed.
O ne o f the few cases in which one can reasonably conclude that the 
sale price was f raudu len t is Canada Permanent M ortgage Corporation v. Jesse. '* 
H ere the m ortgagee obtained an order nisi for sale and proceeded to buy 
in at the sale at which it was the only bidder. T h e  property was knocked 
down to the m ortgagee for the sum o f twenty-five cents although it was in 
the process o f negotiating a private sale at $1,600. T he  court refused to 
confirm  the sale and held that justice required that a decree for disclosure 
absolute be issued thus preventing any deficiency action from  arising.
Similarly, in Briand  v. Carver et a l? h Cowan C.J.T.D. refused to confirm 
a sale and to g ran t a deficiency judgm ent when the property, as valued by 
his Lordship, was probably worth $5,500 yet sold for the m ere sum of $50 
to the foreclosing m ortgagee, leaving a deficiency o f $4,500. Nevertheless, 
his Lordship was prepared  to confirm  the sale if the claim for a deficiency 
judgm en t was abandoned. T he  invitation to com prom ise achieved the same 
result as directed in the Jesse case; namely, foreclosure absolute in the 
technical sense o r a n  acceptance o f the security as full satisfaction o f the 
debt. T h e  court indicated that it had a discretion to assess the adequacy of 
the sale price and , in the circumstances, it was so grossly inadequate that 
it would be inequitable to perm it the plaintiff m ortgagee to purchase at 
that price and obtain a deficiency ju d g m en t.56
1933] 2 W'.W.R. 410 (Sask. K.B.).
3,T h e  injustices which occur in allowing p roperty  to be sold at a price reflecting a nom inal consideration 
is exacerbated d u rin g  a depression. T h e  Am erican solution was to enact m oratoria legislation which p re ­
vented a m ortgagee from  foreclosing; see generally, G.E. O sborne. M ortgages (2nd ed., 1970) at 694 el 
seq.
M( 1909), 11 W.L.R. 295 (Sask. S.C.). 
is (1967). 66 D.L.R (2d) 169 (N.S.T.D.).
* lb id . ,  a t  180.
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T h e  reluctance o f courts to in terfere with a sale at an undervalue is 
subject to the overrid ing qualification that it must not be for a fraudulent 
am ount. Presum ably a property  worth $40,000 at the tim e the m ortgagee 
chooses to sell it, if sold for $50, $100 o r even $1,000, can be viewed as a 
sham sale. W hether o r not the m ortgagee can be said to have acted in good 
faith is irrelevant once a fraudulen t sum has been accepted. W hether or 
not a sale o f the same property  for $10,000 would be classified as coming 
within the fraudu len t rule is a question for which varying responses might 
be invoked. R ather than dwelling on this problem , which may very well 
prove to be a fruitless task, it would be far m ore beneficial to determ ine 
the causes o f such price inadequacies.
O ne cannot help but w onder why it is that property  would sell for a 
fraction of its value even if it can be said that the m ortgagee has acted in 
good faith. T he  Briand  case vividly illustrates the natu re o f  the problem. 
T here , the court supervised the sale by directing that the land be sold at 
public auction after advertising in a local newspaper. No one would wish 
to debate that so long as the m ortgagee has adhered  to instructions as laid 
down by the court, he may be regarded  as having acted in good faith. Yet 
his Lordship com m ented that he found it difficult to explain satisfactorily 
how it could happen that in times o f housing shortages, p roperty  could be 
exposed for sale at public auction afte r advertisem ents over a five-week 
period in a new spaper without creating any real interest in the public in 
attending the sale and in bidding for the property. T h e  answer to this 
question may lie in the nature and content o f  the advertisem ents, the 
physical condition o f the property, its physical location, o r perhaps the 
inadequate technique o f m arketing property  solely by legal advertisem ent.
W ithout em barking on an analysis o f w hether the Nova Scotia practice 
o f foreclosing on real property  as directed by a judge would meet the 
“standard  o f care” required  o f a m ortgagee in exercising a power o f sale, 
it is inevitable that at some point a court is going to accept the argum ent 
or adopt the position that a m ortgagee who fails to take reasonable p re­
cautions has not acted in good faith. Indeed, one can readily appreciate 
that in the sale o f real property, one o f the key factors in effecting a 
disposition at the “best price" involves the adherence to p ro p e r m arketing 
techniques. A failure on the part o f the m ortgagee to act accordingly can 
only increase the likelihood of the security being sacrificed to the detrim ent 
o f the m ortgagor. In o ther words the m ortgagee is acting recklessly.
•
T his approach was adopted by the Newfoundland Suprem e C ourt in 
Frost Ltd. v. Ralph et al*~ wherein a second m ortgagee sold two m ortgaged 
hotel properties valued at slightly under $3,000,000™ for the sum of $123,000
■'"(1981), 115 D.L.R. (3d) 612.
’"T he appra ised  m arket value o f  $2,975,000 d id  not lake into account the  fact that the  title of the m ortgagor 
and  the  m ortgagee was u n d e r attack in o ther p roceedings and  that am  pu rchase r would have to spend 
several h u n d red  thousand  dollars to  comply w ith work o rd e rs  issued by the fire m arshall. T h e  th ree  million 
dollar value was com puted  on  the  basis of the  incom e approac h (see, ti 17-18).
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(the am ount o f the debt), subject to a first m ortgage on which $60,000 was 
owing. While it m ight have been appropria te  to dispense w ith any argum ent 
as to the standard  o f care on the basis o f a sale at a fraudulent price, 
G oodridge J. adopted  a d iffe ren t approach and after reviewing the various 
judgm ents previously exam ined, utilized them  in form ulating the “good 
faith theory”.
A mortgagor is not acting in good faith when the price realized is plainly and 
significantly short o f  the true value o f the property sold, when the mortgagee 
acts willfully and recklessly in the conduct o f the sale with the result that the 
interests o f  the mortgagor are sacrificed, when he fails to take reasonable pre­
cautions to obtain a proper price, or fails to act in a prudent and business-like 
manner with a view to obtaining as large a price as may fairly and reasonably 
with due diligence and attention be under the circumstances obtainable. ’"
His Lordship concluded that the m ortgagee, by om itting to obtain an 
appraisal, by failing to test the m arket in a public forum  and by selling the 
property  for ju st enough to satisfy its m ortgage debt, had f ailed in its duty 
to act in good faith, that is, to take reasonable precautions to obtain a 
p ro p er price.60 T h e  court’s approach, albeit a unique and novel one, bridges 
the gap between what have been traditionally viewed as two opposing stand­
ards. In addition, the judgm en t does provide some guidance as to the type 
o f conduct required  o f a m ortgagee in o rd e r to prevent a sale from  being 
challenged by the debtor.
O f the m ore recent decisions which deals with the issue as to the 
“standard  o f care”, the most revealing with respect to outlining the types 
o f precautions which should be adopted is that o f Eberle J. in Wood v. Bank 
of N ova Scotia et a/.61 T h e  defendant bank, through its solicitors, before 
proceeding to sell the p lain tiffs property  un d er the power of sale obtained 
an “inform al appraisal” from  a real estate agent which placed the property 's 
value at $51,000. Shortly thereafter an oral listing was given to the agent 
and about a m onth later an offer o f $45,000 was accepted. T he plaintiff 
com m enced an action to have the sale set aside or, in the alternative, for 
dam ages for failing to give notice o f the exercise o f the power o f sale as 
required  by statute and for selling at a gross undervalue.
With respect to notice, the court found in the p la in tiffs favour. With 
respect to the sale price, the court held that the defendan t bank had failed 
to take reasonable precautions to bring the property  to the attention o f a 
sufficient num ber o f persons in the m arket place.6’ T h e  appraisal given by 
the real estate agent afforded the defendan t no protection as it was in-
i9Supra. footnote 57 at 622. His L ordship  m aintains that his analysis o f the  law on this issue is m erely a 
restatem ent o f  the  good faith theory.
60Supra , footnote  57 at 622.
^ A fte r  reviewing the authorities, which his I.ordship  terrtis an exam ination of d ifferen t word form ulae, 
the law as stated by Salm on J . in the  Cuckmere case is p re fe rred . See, ibid.. at 175.
6I(1979), 10 R.P.R. 156 (Ont. S.C.).
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adequate. It d isregarded  such factors as zoning, services and “m arket 
value”.65 As well, in adhering  to the “income approach” as a m ethod of 
evaluation, the agent utilized inaccurate figures given by an em ployee of 
the defendan t bank. As for setting aside the sale, the court held that as 
there was no covert scheme or arrangem ent between the purchaser and 
the bank, a sale even at a gross undervalue, is not sufficient to w arrant 
such relief.64 Damages were aw arded on the basis o f  the dif f erence between 
the sale price and the value o f the property  ($65,000) as fixed by the court 
after hearing  the evidence o f  th ree  o ther agents.
Aside from  the actual disposition o f the case, the com m ents m ade by 
the court as to the p ro p e r m ethod o f ef fecting a sale provide recognizable 
param eters su rround ing  a nebulous area o f the law. Firstly, the property 
should have been put on a m ultiple listing service o r o ther steps should 
have been taken to see that the property  came to the attention o f a wide 
segm ent o f the m arket. His Lordship, however, clearly stated that he should 
not be taken as saying that such a m arketing technique is called for in every 
case.65 Secondly, advertising, such as by placing a “for sale” on the property, 
should be considered. Third ly , the m ortgagee should consider whether 
there is a need to sell the property  quickly. If  not, then it can be left on 
the m arket for a longer period, such as a norm al listing period/*6
N otw ithstanding the p lain tiffs success so far as an entitlem ent to dam ­
ages was concerned, an appeal was launched by the plaintiff on the ground 
that the dam ages assessed by the trial ju d g e  were inadequate.67 While that 
appeal was sum m arily dismissed, the defendants cross-appealed on the basis 
that notice had been given to the plaintiff pursuant to statutory p ro ­
vision and that the test applied by Eberle J. with respect to the conduct o f 
a m ortgagee was not the p ro p er one. T he  O ntario  C ourt o f  Appeal reversed 
the trial judge on the first point, but as to p ro p e r test, A rnup  J.A., in 
delivering the judgm en t o f  the C ourt, held that it m ade no difference as 
the defendan t bank had failed to meet either. Accordingly, the cross-appeal 
was dismissed. On this issue, the judgm ent is very cursory and refers only 
to the good faith test as being less stringent when com pared with the m ore
6,His L ordsh ip  com m ented  that he found  it strange that the agent ignored  the “m arket value" when 
u ndertak ing  to place a value on  the  p roperty , tha t is, the  objective fo r which the appraisal was done in 
the  first place. It would ap p ea r that the  agent was giving an opin ion  of value calculated soley on the  income 
approach  ra th e r than  by the  com parative  o r m arket data  approach.
MSo fa r as purchasers  a re  concerned , courts are  unwilling to  set aside a sale provided that the purchaser 
has acted bona fide\ e.g., Haddington Island (¿uary C.o. Ltd. v. Hudson, supra, footnote 33. In terestingly enough 
his Lordship  in dismissing the action against the pu rchaser would not aw ard  her costs given the  “suspit ious 
circum stances" o f  the sale.
'''Supra, foo tno te  61 at 166 and  170.
" i t  should be noted  that the  judgm ent seems to imply that property  should not he sold in the m iddle of 
w inter unless necessary — “T h e re  does not ap p ea r to have been any overw helm ing need to sell the  property 
quickly, no r in the  m iddle of w inter. T h e  p roperty  could v\ell have been  left on the m arket for a longer 
period such as a norm al listing period ." — Ibid., at 170. Contra, the  (.ucktntre case per Salmon |.
67( 19H1). 14 R.P.R 1 (Ont. C.A.).
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stringent test, that is, “the conduct of the m ortgagee must be m ore Hagrant 
than that which is required  by the less stringent test [in good faith]”.*1*
Putting aside the view that to act in good faith necessarily entails taking 
reasonable precautions when disposing o f security un d er a power o f sale, 
the lack o f judicial certainty as to the p roper standard  o f care o r the p roper 
test to be applied in judging the m ortgagee’s conduct perpetuates even 
g reater doubt as to how a secured creditor should undertake a sale. To 
comply with the test o f  acting in good faith, a m ortgagee must refrain from  
acting fraudulently , willfully o r recklessly so as to sacrifice the property o f 
the m ortgagor. In  this regard , sales for a fractional am ount o f the p roperty’s 
value come within this rule even though a m ortgagee may have acted 
reasonably. Yet a sale for an am ount less than the value o f the property is 
not o f itself sufficient to constitute acting in bad faith although the de­
m arcation zone chosen as to when a sale price will come within the definition 
o f “frau d u len t” has not been clearly drawn.
O n the o ther hand, the duty to take reasonable precautions encom ­
passes consideration o f the following m atters: obtaining “p ro p e r” ap­
praisa ls); undertak ing  sufficient advertising; employing a real estate firm; 
utilizing a m ultiple listing service and exposing the property  to the m arket 
for a sufficient period o f time, that is to refrain  from acting hastily. So far 
as the m ortgagee is concerned, once he has acted in accordance with the 
prescribed standard , there  is no duty to postpone a sale until such time as 
a better price can be obtained. T his is true even though the price accepted 
be below appraised value, subject to the qualification that the inadequacy 
should not be caused by any acts o r omissions o f the liquidating creditor 
o r its agents.69
Critique
Despite the apparen t conflict in judicial opinion, the distinction be­
tween a m ortgagee who acts solely in good faith and one who, as well, takes 
reasonable precautions is m ore illusionary than real. T he  question as to 
w hether there is in fact any appreciable difference between what might 
appear to be conflicting statem ents as to the law, to a very limited extent, 
could be answered by re-exam ining those cases previously discussed from 
a factual perspective. For exam ple, in the F atrar and Kennedy v. deTrafford  
cases the court held that the m ortgagee had taken all reasonable precautions 
in any event, while in B.C. Land  Cif Investment Agency v. Ishitaka, the diver­
gence in judicial opinion stems from  a failure to agree on the value o f the 
property  sold and not on the precautions taken. Similarly, in the Haddington 
case there was no evidence to support a sale at a substantial undervalue.
“ Ibid., at 4.
w ln  the  event th e re  is no m arket lo r the property  (notw ithstanding  the precautions taken), to r exam ple, 
d u rin g  a depression , then  o th e r reliel may be necessary — see supra, footnote 53.
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Regardless o f the m anner in which a court describes the obligations o f a 
secured creditor, the w riter is o f  the opinion that none o f these cases can 
be criticized with respect to the result ultimately achieved. T he legal ap­
plication rem ains the same.
Pursuing this issue in such a vein will add little to clarify the legal 
debate perpetuated  through time by the adherence to “word form ulae”70 
adopted in cases each with their own unique circumstances. T h e  preoc­
cupation with deciding which line o f authority is “correct” o r to be “fol­
lowed” detracts from the real issue; a determ ination as to which o f the two 
supposedly differing viewpoints is to be preferred . This determ ination calls 
upon one to question why it is that the obligation or duties o f the liquidating 
creditor should be restricted o r less stringent. O f the decisions dealt with 
in this article, there are only two in which the court addressed this issue. 
T he  first is found in the judgm ent o f  Lindley L.J. in the Kennedy v. deTrafford  
case; the second in the judgm ent o f Lord Salmon in the Cuckmere case.
Lord Lindley’s justification for a less stringent standard  tu rned  on the 
fear that a m ortgagee would be unable to liquidate the security with com ­
parative ease and safety. T his situation might result in fewer people willing 
to lend money, thus im pairing the ability o f would-be debtors to raise 
capital.71 Clearly one need spend but little time considering this argum ent 
in light o f present lending practices. F urtherm ore, such reasoning fails to 
consider the fact that it is in the interest o f the m ortgagee to take reasonable 
precautions, for in so doing, the risk o f any financial loss associated with 
a lending transaction might be elim inated. Such conduct may obviate the 
need to bring an action on the covenant for a deficiency o r at least reduce 
the am ount o f the ultim ate loss should a deficiency judgm ent be o f no 
consequence. Obviously, it is . the interest o f the m ortgagor to require a 
more stringent type o f conduct. A sale undertaken  on this basis will best 
ensure that there is no deficiency o r that it is minimized.
From ano ther perspective, it can be argued that should the value of 
the property  exceed the am ount o f  the debt, then the m ortgagor's equity 
in the property  stands a greater chance o f being realized in the form  of 
surplus proceeds, for which the m ortgagee must account. Lord Salmon in 
the Cuckmere case, in concluding that a m ortgagee owes both duties, adopted 
this line o f reasoning.72 But the justification for insisting on a greater stand­
ard o f care should not be viewed solely from the perspective o f either the 
debtor o r the creditor, for there  may well be o ther vitally concerned and 
affected parties who have a vested interest in the ultimate price for which 
the security is sold.
70Eberle J. in the  Wood case noled that m any of the seemingly conflicting w ord form ulae utilized in defining 
the obligations of the m ortgagee had resulted  in a great deal o f  contusion , \upra. footnote HI at 171-172.
7>Supra, footnote  22 at 773.
rjSupra , footnote  13 at 643.
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T h e  extent o f the liability o f a g uaran to r in a deficiency action will be 
based upon the price which is obtained when effecting a sale.73 Subsequent 
encum brancers, w hether they be judgm en t creditors (by way o f memorial 
o f judgm ent) o r subsequent mortgagees, albeit in the unenviable position 
o f forfeiting the right to realize upon their security are, entitled to any 
surplus funds generated by a sale, in priority to the m ortgagor o r ultimate 
holder o f the equity o f  redem ption .74 For these reasons, the law, as em ­
phatically stated by H ughes C.J. in the Haley case to the effect that a m ort­
gagor owes both duties, is difficult to assail. This view o f the law is entirely 
in accord with the requirem ents being articulated in legislation governing 
the conduct o f various secured creditors, even though the actual word 
form ulae adopted may differ. For exam ple, u nder s. 179 o f the Bank Act1' 
[form erly s.88] a bank is required to act honestly and in good faith in 
connection with the sale o f its security and in addition is required  to deal 
with the property  in a timely and appropriate  m anner having regard to 
the natu re o f the property  and the interest o f  the person by whom the 
security was given. Similarly under the Personal Property Security Act o f 
O ntario76 a secured creditor may dispose o f  collateral on any term s so long 
as every aspect o f the disposition is “commercially reasonable”.77
Clearlv the m ortgagee cannot be characterized as a trustee. On the 
o ther hand, would a trustee be required  to act any differently if he were 
selling trust property? T h e  trustee discharges his duty by taking all those 
precautions which an ordinary  p ruden t man o f business would take in 
m anaging his own affairs.78 T he  m ortgagee is required to act in good faith 
and to take reasonable precautions to obtain the best price. O f course, the 
manifest d ifference between the two lies in the fact that the form er would 
surely be un d er a duty to postpone a sale until better m arket conditions 
arose,79 whereas the latter once he has acted in accord with the standard
75It is generally accepted that a surety is en titled  to  any right of set-olf or counterclaim  which the principal 
deb tor possesses against the c red ito r (see generally; H alsburv’s, supra. Vol 20, para. 190). but recently 
doubt has been cast upon this proposition  — Barclays Bank Lid. v. Thienel el al. u n re p o rted  decision ot 
Thesiger J., no ted  in 122 Sol. )ournal 472.- However, it has been widely criticized; e.g.. Rowlatt O n the 
Law of Principal A nd Surety (4th ed . by I). M arks Sc G. Moss) at 182. and  is difficult to reconcile with 
o th e r au thorities; e.g. the Holey case, supra footnote 44.
74£.£.; Canada Permanent Toronto General Trust Co. v. Hollis Pharmacy Ltd. el al (1964). 48 D.L.K. (2d) 747 
(N.S.) — application bv second m ortgage for paym ent out ot surp lus proceeds in priority to two judgm ent 
creditors; Tomlin v. I uie, supra, footnote  19 — action by second m ortgagee against first m ortgagee t hunting 
an account o f all monies that were received o r should have been received but for the  latter's  negligence 
in m isdescribing the  property  at the  auction sale.
75S.C. 1980, c.40.
7hR.S.O. 1980. c. 375 as am ended .
^Ibid.. s.59(3).
^Supra , footnote 11.
7t,See D.W.M. W aters, Law ot T ru sts  in Canada, \upra. footnote  11 at 661-665.
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o f care can sell even if a better price could have been obtained by postponing 
the sale.80
T h e difficulty most likely to be encountered when exercising a power 
o f sale will lie in the m ortgagee scrutinizing his own conduct to see w hether 
he is acting in accord with the somewhat illusive standar d irescribed by 
law and perhaps m ore im portantly, to adhere to that standard  without 
acting negligently. T he  simplest solution with respect to taking reasonable 
precautions is to e irp loy  the services o f a real estate agent who can advise 
as to the p roper m arketing techniques and in addition can undertake the 
task o f properly m arketing the property  in such circum stances.81 In so 
doing, the m ortgagee transfers many o f the legal duties imposed upon him 
to a professional who will bear responsibility for acting in a negligent m an­
ner either in failing to adop t reasonable precautions or carrying them  out 
in such a m anner which can be categorized as m ore than “e rro r o f ju d g ­
m ent”.
The problem s which arose in the Cuckmere case as to the liability o f a 
principal for the acts o f  its agents, even if the estate agent was classified as 
an independent contractor, could have been avoided had the defence been 
properly raised at trial and the estate agents jo ined as a party. Ultimately, 
the estate agent would have been called upon to com pensate e ither the 
defendant m ortgagee if he were held liable or if not, then the plaintiffs 
directly.82 For those who feel that the e rro r was one o f judgm ent, ra ther 
than negligence, it is interesting to note that no experts were called upon 
to give evidence in support of the estate agent’s opinion.
T he  utilization o f  prof essionals in m arketing property constitutes m ore 
than a m ethod o f  avoiding responsibility and liability’. It ensures p rudent 
conduct in attem pting to realize a p roper price. Admittedly, there are 
individuals who effect a sale o f  their property, outside the realm of forced 
sales, and without the aid o f real estate agents, but it m ust be acceded to 
that for the most part it is m ore efficient and appropriate  to engage the
mE.g.. R t McMurdo. Fenfitld v. McMurdo. (1902) 2 Ch. 684 (C.A.); the  Cutkmrrr case, supra, footnote 13. 
While the  m ortgagee is not u n d e r an  obligation to  postpone the  sale till m arket conditions im prove (Bui 
cf. Wood v. Hank of Nova Scotia ft al. supra, footnote 61) this c red ito r is still u n d e r an obligation to expose1 
the property  to the m arket fo r a sufficient period  of time, tha t is, to refrain  from  acting hastily w hen there  
is no need. N onetheless it m ust be adm itted  th a t given poor m arket conditions it mav well be necessary to 
keep the property  in the m arket place fo r a g rea ter period of time; a consideration  which has the effect 
of postponing  a sale.
81 As to the  m ailers which should be considered  in m arketing  p roperty  in "forced-sale situations”, secured 
creditors and  the ir solicitors will find M artin S tam bler’s article. "Selling T h e  P roperty" — 1981 M ortgage 
Rights and  Rem edies — D epartm ent of C ontinu ing  Education, T h e  Law Society of U pper C anada (1-1 to 
1-42) a practical and  invaluable guide.
82T h e  liability of a principal fo r a to rt com m itted  by its agent, who is classified as a servant, acting within 
the  scope of his au thority  is clear. 1 he difficulties arise in subscribing a m eaning to  the  phrase  "scope of 
authority". W hether a principal is liable for the tort of an in d ep en d en t con tracto r is a question to which 
the law has not provided a definite answer. A fu rth e r problem  arises w hen one seeks to d e te rm ine  w hether 
a real estate agent is classified as an in d ependen t contractor; see generally R Powell. T he  L.aw of Agency 
(2nd ed.) at 184 to 187, 197 and  343.
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services o f a professional when m arketing real property. W hether the sale 
be effected by private contract, public tender o r public auction, the real­
izable sale price is dependen t on the property  being properly exposed to 
the m arket place. Advertising and salesm anship are essential ingredients 
in an attem pt to protect the interests o f the debtor, its guarantors and other 
creditors, including the one exercising the power o f  sale.
Given this theoretical fram ework, the w riter’s task must tu rn  to an 
exam ination o f the practice su rround ing  forced sales in this Province and 
to com pare it with the prescribed standard , nebulous as it m ight seem. I he 
objective is to determ ine w hether the foreclosing m ortgagee would be ex­
onerated  o f any culpability in the event o f a sale at an undervalue.
EXERCISING THE POWER OF SALE — NEW BRUNSWICK 
PRAC :ic e  
General
Any attem pt to outline the practice being followed in carrying out a 
rem edial process, which is private in nature, is open to the valid criticism 
that at best it is only a perception which may or may not be true in any 
owe particular situation o r at any one point in time. Accordingly, it is 
neces. ary to make a num ber o f fundam ental assumptions.
Firstly, the general practice is perceived to be one in which the only 
precautions which are being taken are those required by the term s o f the 
m ortgage docum ent and the Property Act respectively. With respect to the 
form er, it is generally acknowledged that m ortgagees are content to rely 
on the statutory power and in any event are better advised to refrain  from 
drafting  any contractual provisions which d iffe r from it.83 T hus this article 
proceeds on a second assum ption; namely that the contractual provisions 
do not materially d iffer from  the statutory requirem ents. T hirdly, the gen­
eral practice is perceived to be one in which the vast majority o f m ortgage 
sales, in New Brunswick are effected un d er the auspices o f the local sheriff 
by way o f public auction. If  this is correct, then one can specualte with 
some certainty that this phenom enon arises as a result o f a m ortgagee being 
able to buy in for his own purposes so long as the sale is effected in this 
m anner.84
ssSupra, footnote 14, Halsburv's slates that it would be unusual a fte r 1882 to insert an express power of 
sale except in special circum stances— see para. 708 at 3‘23. Fisher and  l.ightw ixxl's Law o f  M ortgages (9th 
ed., by E.L.G. Tyler) indicates that reliance is usually placed on  the  statu tory  pow er (at 360). Variations 
from  the statu tory  pow er in New Brunswick are  perm itted  by s.44(2) of the Property Act. However, in 
Gauinn v. Dionne, supra, footnote 46 it was held that certain  variations could result in ihe  m ortgagee being 
unable to rely on  the  statutory pow er so as to take advantage o f  its provisions; r.g., power to buy in for 
ones own purposes pu rsuan t to s.44(4).
Mlbtd., and  supra, footnote 6.
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Viewing the general practice from  this vantage point, the issue turns 
on w hether m ere compliance with the Property Act is apt to result in a sale 
at a reasonable price. T h e  Act requires a m ortgagee in exercising the power 
o f sale (in addition to giving notice to the m ortgagor) to insert in two 
succeeding issues o f the Royal Gazette a notice o f  the im pending sale;85 to 
insert a notice o f sale in a local new spaper once each week for four weeks86 
and to post one prin ted  handbill on the local court house, one in the 
appropria te  registry office and one at another public location.87 Are these 
m arketing techniques appropriate? Do they have the effect o f attracting 
potential purchasers who are willing to pay a reasonable price? T h e  re­
sponse is obvious when com paring the types o f precautions taken in the 
Cuckmere case and the rem arks o f Eberle J., in Wood v. Bank o f N ova Scotia.** 
M oreover, there is o ther evidence which would lead to the conclusion that 
the m arketing techniques adhered  to in this Province are ineffectual.
In canvassing the Sheriffs o f four judicial districts the writer was in­
form ed that at the vast majority o f auction sales the only person in at­
ten d an ce  was th e  fo reclosing  m o rtg ag ee  o r its so lic ito r.89 It is not 
unw arranted to conclude that a m ortgagee who is guided solely by the 
statutory provisions is unlikely to effect a sale at a reasonable price unless 
the property  is o f  a natu re which does not need m arketing in the usual 
m anner.90 T he  price at which a foreclosing m ortgagee buys in at these sales 
gives rise to o ther considerations which will be discussed in turn .
Perhaps the most blatant exam ple o f conduct which falls below the 
required  standard  is the adherence to the practice o f providing a legal 
description o f the property  without even referring  to the civic address, 
should one exist. This phenom enon is true even though the Property Act 
specifically states that it is not necessary to provide a legal description so 
long as the premises can be readily identified.91 In any event no attem pts 
are being m ade to bring out the “saleable” features o f the property; that 
is, the advertisem ents are only inserted for the purpose o f complying with 
the Act.
“ Section 45(1 )(a) of the Property Act requires com pliance with the Sale of Lands Publication Act, R.S.N.B. 
1973, C. S-2, which calls for the  insertion  o f  notices in the Roval Gazette. Section 1(4) o f  the latter Act 
states that a sale is invalid unless the  provisions o f  this Act are  followed.
“•’Section 45( 1 )(c) of the  Poroperty Act.
»'Ibid
•“ See supra, footnote 61 and  text which follows.
am  indebted  to Sherif fs; Peter Dickens (Judicial District o f  Fredericton), Donald Hadley (judicial District 
of B athurst). H arold  Gillespie (Judicial District o f Saint John ), Jam es W olfe (judicial District of Saint John), 
for providng m e with info rm ation  relating to m ortgage sales. T h e  following percentages are  estim ates of 
auction sales in which the  m ortgagee o i its solicitor is the onlv person in attendance: Saint Jo h n  99%; 
Fredericton 80%; M oncton 95% B athurst 95%.
•“S heriff Gillespie indicated that auction sales were well a ttended  in Saint Jo h n  when the p roperty  in 
question was o f  an exceptional industrial natu re . Sheriff Dickens indicated that very few com m ercial 
buildings in F redericton  reached the auction block.
'"Section 45(3) o f the  Property Act.
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T h e  fact that a m ortgagee who adheres solely to the statutory require­
m ents would be in breach o f the duty being imposed by the courts, does 
not necessarily entail the conclusion that this creditor is u nder the same 
obligation when it comes to liquidating a debt pursuant to the Property Act. 
Surely there  m ust be a justification o r reason for adhering to the perceived 
present practice, notw ithstanding the law as expounded by the courts over 
the past ten years. In o ther words, what defences are there to an action in 
which it is alleged that the liquidating m ortgagee has failed to abide by his 
obligations and therefo re  must account for what he should have received 
but for this failure? T h e  available defences seem to be limited to two: (1) 
that the advertising requirem ents o f the Property Act constitute a complete 
code with respect to the precautions necessary in o rder to effect a sale and; 
(2) that certain statutory provisions extricate the m ortgagee from  liability 
with regard  to a sale at undervalue. O f these two defences, it would appear 
that only the second has been argued  in a judicial forum . U nfortunately, 
the court declined the opportun ity  to en ter into an “academic debate" as 
to the m eaning o f those provisions.92
Defences
. . . .  - AThe validity o f the proposition that the Property Act provides a complete 
code as to the conduct required  o f a m ortgagee finds some credence in 
Falconbndge On M ortgages w herein a portion o f a vintage O ntario  judgm ent 
is quoted: “It is the ordinary  course before a sale by auction to give every 
publicity to it by advertisem ent in the new spapers, and by handbills; I 
should have said it is the invariable practice . . .  It is the course o f this court 
and the practice o f everyone who desires to get the best price that can be 
gotten for the property  to be sold.”93 From an historical perspective, one 
can appreciate that such advertising might have been sufficient during  the 
19th century. For exam ple, prin ted  handbills posted at prom inent public 
locations and in sufficient num bers were apt to be seen and read by those 
wishing to purchase property , m uch as today one would look at the real 
estate section in a local paper.
Nonetheless, the past is present and we find in the City o f Saint John  
one o f th ree notices being posted behind the glass enclosure at “C hubb’s 
C o rn er” affixed one atop ano ther due to a lack o f space o r thum b tacks. 
Only the articling clerk ever asks why and even then the justification lacks 
any merit. Yet the entire argum ent that the act represents a com plete code 
is based on the assum ption that the purpose o f complying with the notice 
requirem ents is to attract purchasers to an im pending sale. O ne might
92Nova Scotia Savings &  Loan v. M acKenz.it, supra, footnote 47.
n Supra, footnote  14 at 737 quo ting  Spragge V.C. in Richmond v. Evans (1861), 8 G r. 508 at 518. W ith 
respect to p rin ted  handbills the  3rd  edition  o f  Falconbridge (1942) re fe rred  to the fact that it would be 
usual to post about one h u n d red  posters a lthough  fifty would be sufficient (at 693). I his is a far cry from  
he th ree  requ ired  u n d e r the  Property Act.
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obtain such an im pression upon reading the applicable section o f the Prop­
erty Act but even then doubt can be cast upon such an interpretation.
T h e  com parable section enacted in 190394 stated that the power o f sale 
could not be exercised unless the m ortgagor was given at least two m onths 
notice o f the im pending sale; o r unless such notice was published in the 
Royal Gazette or some daily o r weekly new spaper and printed handbills 
were posted at th ree designated locations.94 Clearly, at this point in time, 
this statutory provision was aimed at ensuring  that the m ortgagor was given 
notice o f  the sale th rough one m edium  o r another. In the absence o f this 
particular provision, the power o f sale could have been exercised without 
notice if expressly provided for in the m ortgage docum ent.95 T hus if one 
wished to take advantage o f the statutory provisions then notice was nec­
essary and a potential source o f abuse was avoided.
T he  Revised Statutes o f New Brunswick o f 1927 evidence a reworking 
o f the section so as to indicate unequivocally that its purpose was to provide 
alternative m ethods o f providing the m ortgagor with notice.96 However, in 
the Revised Statutes o f New Brunswick o f 1952, the relevant section failed 
to include any conjunctions such that the section read as follows:
43. (1) A mortgagee shall not exercise the power of sale conferred by section
42 unless:
(a) he has given to the mortgagor at least one month’s notice in writing, 
specifying the time and place o f  sale;
(b) such notice has been published for at least one month in The Royal 
Gazette or some daily or weekly newspaper published in the county 
within which the lands lie (or in the case o f chattels personal, where 
the mortgage is recorded or hied), and in the case o f lands, by printed 
handbills, one o f  which has been posted in or on the court house, one 
at, in or on the registry office, and one in some public place in the 
city, town or parish in which the lands are situate;
‘"Real Properly Act, Con. Stat. o f  N.B (1903), C hpt. 152, s.42.
9iSee generally, Falconbridge O n  M ortgages, supra, foo tno te  14 at 723, notes 1 & 2.
«R .S .N  B. 1927, C hpt. 168, s.42(l).
(1) A m ortgagee shall not exercise the pow er of sale conferred  by the last preceding section unless:
(a) He has given to the  m ortgagor at least one m onth 's  notice in writing, specifying the tim e and  
place o f  sale; or.
Such notice has been published  for at least one m o n th ’s notice in writing, specifying the tim e and  
place of sale; o r.
Such notice has been published  fo r at least one m onth  in T h e  Royal Gazette o r some daily o r weekly 
new spaper published in the  county  within which the lands lie o r in the case o f  chattels personal w here 
the  m ortgage is recorded  o r hied, and  in the case of lands, by p rin ted  handbills, one of which has 
been posted  in, o r  on the  court house, one at, in o r on  the registry office, and one in some public 
place in the  parish in which the  lands are  situate.
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(c) he has complied with the provisions o f  the Sale o f  Land Publication
Act.»7
Two practical problem s arose at this time; (1) a m ortgagee for some 
unknow n reason had to comply with all notice and publication requirem ents 
and; (2) the reference to the Sale o f  Lands Publication Act meant fu rther 
publication in T h e  Royal Gazette.98 An attem pt to correct these problem s 
was m ade in 1954 by am ending the above quoted section by adding the 
word “o r” at the end o f clause “a” and the word “an d ” at the end o f clause 
“b” 99 Regrettably, this am endm ent then created a fu rth e r ambiguity. Was 
a m ortgagee required  to comply with clause “a” and in the event this could 
not be done then clause “b” and “c”, o r in the alternative was it necessary 
to comply with either clause “a” o r clause “b” (but not both) and then as 
well clause “c”? T h e  first option does not seem reasonable unless a m ort­
gagee merely com plied with clause “a”. T h e  second only m ade sense if a 
m ortgagee com plied with clause “a” and clause “c” (rather than clause “b” 
and “c”) for it avoided duplicity o f publication in the Royal Gazette. T his 
dilem m a was inadvertently resolved when in the Revised Statutes o f New 
Brunswick o f 1973 the word “o r” at the end o f clause “a”, was om itted; an 
oversight which resulted in the necessity o f complying with all th ree sub­
sections.100 Accordingly, the legislature intervened in 1975 by enacting an 
am endm ent to the section adding the word “o r” after clause “a”.101 In so 
doing the problem s which existed in 1954 arose once again.
It was not until 1979 that the ambiguities contained in the relevant 
section were finally resolved. T he  entire subsection was repealed and re­
placed with a provision calling for compliance with; (a) the Sale o f Lands 
Publication A ct; (b) notice being given to the m ortgagee by way o f registered 
mail and; (c) publication in a daily o r weekly new spaper and in addition, 
the posting o f prin ted  handbills at the th ree designated locations.102 Has 
legislative intent been sacrificed for the sake o f  clarity? Bearing in mind 
that the Royal Gazette has a limited and elite num ber o f subscribers, that 
advertising is usually restricted to providing a legal description and that 
notices posted at th ree public locations serve no useful purpose, it is difficult 
to accept that the legislature ever in tended that the Property Act be regarded 
as providing a com plete code as to the conduct required  o f a m ortgagee.
While it is clear that this Act is no longer concerned with providing 
the m ortgagee with alternative m ethods o f serving the m ortgagor (and
97R.S.N.B. 1952, C hpt. 177. T h e  am ount o f  nolice to  be given to the m ortgagor was reduced  to  one  m onth.
98The Sale of Lands Publication Act, R.S.N'.B. 1952, C hpt. 200, s. 1, requ ired  publication o f a notice of sale 
in two succeeding issues o f  the  Royal Gazette.
*»S.N.B. 1954, C hpt. 68 , s .l .
IOOR.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-19, s.45(l).
'“'S .N .B . 1975, C hpt. 46, s .l.
I0*S.N.B. 1979, c.58, s .l.
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those with an interest in the equity o f redem ption) with notice ot the 
im pending sale, it is m ore than interesting to note that the publication o f 
notices in both the Royal Gazette and local newspapers continues to be 
addressed solely to these parties. At no time has the writer seen an adver­
tisem ent inserted with the obvious intention o f attracting those who m ight 
be interested in purchasing the property  o r o f elaborating on its m arketable 
features.
T h ere  are two subsections which refer to the lack o f responsibility for 
loss which occurs upon exercising the power o f sale. T h e  first is found in 
paragraph  44(1 )(a) which provides:
44(1) A mortgagee, where the mortgage is made by deed, shall, by virtue o f 
this Act, have the following powers to the like extent as if they had been 
in terms conferred by the mortgagee deed, but not further, namely:
(a) a power, when the mortgage money, or any interest thereon has 
become due, to sell, or to concur with any other person in selling, the 
mortgaged property or any part thereof, and either together or in lots, 
by public auction or by private contract, subject to such conditions re­
specting title or evidence o f title or other matter as the mortgagee thinks 
ht, with power to vary any contract fo r sale, and to buy in at auction, or to 
rescind a contract for sale and to resell, without being answerable fo r any loss 
occasioned thereby, [emphasis added]
T h e  right to buy in at an auction without being answerable for any 
loss m ight be in terp re ted  as providing a m ortgagee, who complies with the 
statutory power, with insulation against anyone dissatisfied with the sale 
price. O n the o ther hand, this provision could be in terp reted  so as to 
provide the m ortgagee with protection only if he has acted in accord with 
the standard  prescribed by law. T h ere  is, however, a th ird  view which is 
for the most part only o f historical significance. Yet it does provide one 
with a plausible and rational explanation as to the original purpose o f this 
particular subsection.
Statutory provisions with respect to the power o f sale were first enacted 
in England in 1860 wit! the introduction o f Lord Cransworths A ct,im and 
later replaced by the Conveyancing and Law oj Property Act in 1881.104 Section 
19 o f the latter Act, the equivalent o f the New Brunswick provision, read 
as follows:
A power, when the mortgage money has become due, to sell, or to concern with 
any other person in selling, the mortgaged property or any part thereof, either 
subject to prior changes or not, and either together or in lots, by public auction 
or by private contract, subject to such conditions respecting titles, or evidence 
o f titles, or other matters, as he (the mortgagee) thinks ht, with power to vary any 
contract fo r sale, and to buy in at an auction, or to rescind any contract fo r iale, and to 
resell without being answerable fo r any loss occasioned thereby, [emphasis added].
,0S“An Act to give to T rustees, M ortgagees and  o thers certain  powers now com m only inserted  in Settlem ents. 
M ortgages and  Wills," I860, I .K.. C . 145.
1041881 U.K., C.41.
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T h e  substantial difference between the present New Brunswick p ro ­
vision and that ju st quoted lies in the crucial placem ent o f one comma. 
A fter the phrase “to rescind any contract for sale” the English section 
contains a com m a and then goes on to say that a m ortgagee can resell 
without being answerable for any loss occasioned thereby. T h e  English 
section is in terp re ted  as perm itting a m ortgagee to buy in at a sale for the 
purpose o f reselling w ithout being answerable for any loss o r to rescind a 
contract for sale and to resell (by way o f contract) without being answerable 
for any loss.105 T h e  right to buy in at a sale for the purpose o f reselling 
may be viewed as a device to avoid a sale at an undervalue or at a price 
that a m ortgagee does not think reasonable.106 Should the second sale not 
realize an am ount at least equal to the first, then provided the m ortgagee 
has taken reasonable precautions he should not be called upon to account 
for the difference. T he  erro r, if any, is one o f judgm en t and not negligence.
T he  right to rescind a contract and subsequently sell at a lower price 
without fear o f being called upon to account for the higher price is justified. 
A m ortgagee _who enters into a contract o f sale u-ider the power at an 
agreed price may find the purchaser withdrawing from  the transaction in 
breach o f his obligations. T he  m ortgagee then discovers that the same price 
cannot be obtained and ultimately sells for a lower am ount. So long as the 
m ortgagee has acted reasonably, it would be unjustified to have him account 
for the proceeds based on the h igher sale am o u n t.107
T he statutory provision o f 1881 found its way into the Acts o f New 
Brunswick in 1903108 including the com m a referred  to earlier. However, 
in 1919, the New Brunswick C ourt o f Appeal in Gauvin  v. Dionne11)9 held 
that the power to buy in at an auction m eant to buy in for one’s own 
purposes in the same way as was done when leave to all parties to bid was 
given by a decree for foreclosure and sale in Chancery. This decision 
although still d o u b ted ,110 was subsequently codified by the New Brunswick 
legislature in 1952, and the “com m a” was removed so as to coincide with 
the in terpretation  given by the court o f appeal, this is, to buy in for its own
"’’.Supra, footnote 14, Falconbridge on M ortgages at 742, note 8 .
wfiQne could achieve this end  by setting a reserve price.
l07O ne of the  few cases in which this statutory provision was of benefit to a m ortgagee is W right v. N.Z. 
Farmers Co-Operative Association o f Canterbury Ltd., [1939] A.C. 439 (P.C.). H ere  the m ortgagee was held not 
accountable to the m ortgagor for the purchase  price for which the property  was agreed to  be sold under 
a rescinded contract. It was rescinded because the p u rchaser had failed to com plete the transaction before
the p roperty  had vested in him. T h e  m ortgagee was unable to get as high a price when en tering  into a 
subsequent contract with an o th e r pruchaser. It would ap p ea r that the m ortgagee was u n d e r no obligation 
to sue fo r dam ages if such were recoverable.
m Supra, foo tno te  94, s.41.
lwGauvtn v. Dionne, supra, footnote  46.
llrtSee Falconbridge On Mortgages, supra, footnote 14 at 742, note 8.
112 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL  •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
purposes ra th er than to r the purpose of reselling.111 In attem pting to avoid 
any ambiguity as to the right o f a m ortgagee to buy in at a sale, the m eaning 
to be given to the phrase, “and to resell”, was restricted to situations in 
which the contract was rescinded. In so doing, it is questionable w hether 
the legislature ever intended that the m ortgagee be relieved o f its duty to 
take reasonable precautions. Indeed, this runs contrary to the decision o f 
Barry J., in the G auvin  case where he held that although a m ortgagee has 
a right to buy in for his own purposes, he is still under the duty to take 
reasonable precautions.112
T h e second statutory provision which m ight be utilized in an attem pt 
to avoid an accounting on the basis o f what a m ortgagee should have 
received had he taken reasonable precautions is found in section 47(6) o f 
the Property Act:
The mortgagee, his executors, or assigns, shall not be answerable for any in­
voluntary loss happening in or about the exercise or execution o f the power o f 
sale conferred by section 44 or o f  any trust connected therewith."5
T he m eaning which is to be attribu ted  to the words “involuntary loss’ 
is extrem ely difficult to ascertain in the absence o f any judicial pronounce­
ment, but it has been said that the practical value o f this statutory protection 
is d oub tfu l.114 O n the o ther hand the section seems to imply, that a m ort­
gagee is responsible for any voluntary loss which could be construed as 
m eaning any loss resulting from  a failure to take reasonable precautions. 
This in terpretation  runs contrary to paragraph  44(1 )(a) of the Property Act 
which states that a m ortgagee who buys in at a sale is not answerable for 
any loss. Any reconciliation o f the two provisions can only be effected by 
holding that paragraph  44(1 )(a) does not negate any obligation to take 
reasonable precautions.
For the secured creditor who insists that these provisions offer a shield 
in the event o f  an attack upon a sale, there is one statutory provision which 
could be cited for the proposition that a m ortgagee is liable for a failure 
to take reasonable precautions. Sub-section 47(2) o f the Property Act p ro ­
vides:
Where a conveyance is made in prof essed exercise o f the power o f  sale conferred 
by section 44 the title o f  the purchaser is not impeachable on the ground that 
no case had arisen to authorize the sale, or that due notice was not given or that 
the power was otherwise improperly or irregularly exercised; but any person 
damnified by an authorized or improper or irregular exercise of the power shall 
have his remedy in damages against the person exercising the power.
" 'R .S .N .B . 1952. C hpt. 177, s.42(a).
1,2Supra, foo tno te  46 at 302.
M,A sim ilar provision was first enacted in England; The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, U.K., 
C.41, subsection 21(6).
n iSupra. footnote 14, para . 728 at 335; P. Butt, "T h e  M ortgagee’s Duty on Sale”, 53 Aust. L.). 172 at 183 
to the  sam e effect and  o th e r w riters cited there in  who have adop ted  the same view.
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T he reference to an im proper sale, although one which will not be set aside 
by the cou rt,115 could be taken as m eaning that a m ortgagor, for example, 
has his rem edy in dam ages in the event there is a failure to adhere to the 
prescribed standard .
T he purpose o f the aforegoing analysis was not to provide answers to 
questions which arise in in terp re ting  various sections o f the Property Act. 
R ather it was to show the inheren t weaknesses in those argum ents which 
could be advanced to support an im provident sale conducted in a m anner 
as evidenced by present practice. Ultimately, the answers will depend  upon 
the construction placed upon these provisions by a court. In so doing, one 
has to be cognizant that, in the absence o f clear language, a court will 
choose the one that is less likely to work an injustice o r hardship  on in ter­
ested parties. Indeed, it would seem contradictory for a court to impose a 
certain standard  o f conduct only to in terpret statutory provisions with the 
result that this standard  can be ignored. If the legislature has failed to 
address the issues raised, then is there any argum ent which would justify 
a court in allowing a lower standard  to be observed?
O f course, the need to resort to any argum ents will be unnecessary if 
the m ortgagee has sold the property , albeit to himself, at what may be 
term ed a reasonable price in the circumstances. Not only must there be a 
duty which is breached but as well “dam ages” must result from  a failure 
to observe it. It is conceivable that a property could sell for a very advan­
tageous price notw ithstanding the fact that very little m arketing had been 
carried out in anticipation o f the sale. O n the o ther hand, should the 
property be sold to the m ortgagee for a fractional am ount o f its value, then 
problems arise which are unknow n to o ther com m on law jurisdictions. Not 
only can the m ortgagee buy in at the sale, but as well he can sue for a 
“deficiency”. T hus the right o f a m ortgagee to buy in at an auction sale 
gives rise to fu rth e r issues, the resolution o f which may affect the in ter­
pretation o f the statutory provisions already discussed.
THE RIGHT OF A MORTGAGEE TO BUY IN AT ITS OWN SALE 
The Right To Do So
English and Canadian courts have for the most part been unswayed 
by any argum ent in support o f  the proposition that a m ortgagee should 
be perm itted to buy in at its own m ortgage sale conducted pursuant to a 
power o f sale.116 By contrast, in “foreclosure and sale proceedings”, a liq­
uidating m ortgagee may be perm itted  to buy in at a sale at the discretion 
o f the court. For example, in O ntario , the m ortgagee instituting the action
" 'T h is  subsection will not protect a p u rchaser in the event he has actual o r  constructive notice: Hailes v. 
Barnes, [1894] 1 Ch. 25 (C.A.) per Stirling ]. at 30.
ll6Supra, footnot 17 and  cases cited there in . T h e  exception to the  ru le is found  in Gauvin v. Dionne, supra, 
footnote 46.
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may not bid except where leave is given in which case the sale is conducted 
by a solicitor for one o f the o ther p artie s."7 T h e  precautions taken in such 
circum stances stem from  the view that a m ortgagee would be in conflict 
with his duty to obtain the best price and his interest to pay the lowest 
am ount possible.118 At the same time, if p reparations for a sale have been 
extensive, then theoretically in a forum  o f competitiveness, the inclusion 
of the m ortgagee in this g roup  o f would-be purchasers should enhance the 
sale price which is ultimately realized. This is all predicated on the u n d er­
standing that the m ortgagee o r party who has control o f the sale is under 
an obligation to take reasonable precautions in m arketing the property.
T h e  justifications p ro ferred  by chancery judges in the nineteenth  cen­
tury when establishing the rule that a m ortgagee may not purchase u nder 
the power, property  which he has taken as security, are limited to two; the 
first, that a man cannot contract with him self and the second, that a trustee 
cannot purchase the property  which is the subject o f the tru s t.119 T he second 
rationale is non-existent given the fact that the m ortgagee is no longer 
characterized as a trustee. Be that as it may, the right o f a m ortgagee to 
buy the property  o f its deb tor un d er the power arises un d er legislative 
authority in New Brunswick. T h e  right, however, is limited to a sale by 
way o f public auction and can be viewed as one o f the prim ary advantages 
in conducting a sale pursuant to the provisions o f the Property Act. Yet the 
real issue is not w hether the legislature should allow a m ortgagee to buy 
in but ra ther at which price may this liquidating creditor do so? This issue 
has arisen in New Brunswick.
In N ova Scotia Savings &  Loan v. M acK enzie,v¿(> the defenant m ortgagor 
went into default on its m ortgage to the plaintiff, at which time approx i­
mately $39,000 was due on principal and interest. T he  plaintiff exercised 
his power o f sale and was the successful and sole b idder at $10,000, which 
left a deficiency o f $29,000. T h ree  m onths later the plaintiff sold the p ro p ­
erty through a real estate agent for $9,000 m ore than it had paid and then 
com m enced an action for a deficiency based on the am ount obtained on 
the first sale. Angers J . (as he then was), in a sum m ary m anner, notes the 
apparen t conflict between paragraph  44(l)(a) and sub-section 47(6) o f the 
Property Act but declined the opportunity  to “attem pt an academic recon­
ciliation o f how much any involuntary loss should restrict any loss.”1-1 In
" 'R u le  455 of the  O n tario  Rule of C o u rt provides that all parties may bid except the party  having the 
conduct of the  sale. See generallv, M arriot and  D unn Practice In  M ortgage Actions In O n ta rio  (4th ed., 
bv G.W. D unn Sc E.J. Freyseng) at 200. As well, in Nova Scotia, a m ortgagee is perm itted  to buy in at a 
sale; see Practice M em orandum  16 issued by Cow an, C .J.T .D . contained  in C anadian  M ortgage Practice
R eporter at 74-401; see also Bnand  v. Carver et al. \upra, foo tno te  55.
u *Supra, M arriot & D unn at 200.
""F arrar v Farrars Ltd. (1881), 40 Ch. D. 395 at 404, per Chilly, ), at trial.
'•"Supra, footnote 47.
'-’Ibid.. at 80.
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holding that a m ortgagee is obligated to take reasonable precautions, his 
Lordship stated: “it m ust be borne in m ind that New Brunswick contrary 
to o ther provinces gives statutorily very little protection to the m ortgagor 
in cases where the m ortgagee purchases at the sale. T h e  law, as stated by 
C hief Justice H ughes in Canadian Imperial Bank o f Commerce v. H aley, gives 
him m ore.”122
His Lordship then went on to hold that the plaintiff had failed to take 
any, let alone reasonable, precautions to obtain the true  m arket value o f 
the property  and accordingly fixed its value on the basis o f the second sale 
and allowed a ju d g m en t for a deficiency utilizing this figure. It must be 
assum ed that the plaintiff merely com plied with the statutory provisions 
and had relied on s.44 o f the Property Act to avoid an attack on the first 
sale, as these points were not fully set out in the ju d g m en t.1-1’
Even though one m ight view this case as an instance in which principles 
o f “justice and fairness” prevail over technical argum ents, there are going 
to be instances where a m ortgagor is unable to defend an action in which 
a deficiency is being claimed so as to argue an im provident sale based on 
a failure to take reasonable precautions. In addition, an action on the 
covenant for a deficiency could be b rought prior to the m ortgagee effecting 
a private sale. Presumably on the basis o f  the Haley and N ova Scotia Savings 
&  Loan cases, the m ortgagee would have to account for what he should 
have received had he taken reasonable precautions. If the practice su r­
round ing  m ortgage sales continues despite the volley o f w arning shots being 
fired by New Brunswick courts, then at what price should the property  be 
sold to the foreclosing m ortgagee? T h ere  are at least th ree approaches 
which are being adopted; (1) to buy in at a nom inal am ount; (2) to buy in 
at the am ount o f the outstanding indebtedness and; (3) to buy in at the 
fair o r forced m arket value.
Not only does the general practice in New Brunswick involve a m ort­
gagee buying in at its own sale but, as well, it involves buying in for a 
nom inal am ount, varrying from  $100 to S I,000.124 Such sales can only be
m lbid.. T h e  sam e could be said of a sale in which the  m ortgagee is not the  purchaser in the  event reasonable 
precautions have not been taken.
l25T h e  pow er of sale in this case was exercised p rio r to the  1979 am endm ent o f  the Property Act {supra, 
footnote 102) and  th e re fo re  it is conceivable that the m ortgagee m ight have onlv given notice to  the 
m ortgagor and  re fra ined  from  inserting  anv advertisem ent in e ithe r the Koval G azette o r a local new spaper 
(see text supra, com m encing at footnote  99). H owever, the  w riter has been lead to believe that p rio r to the 
1979 am endm en t the  general practice entailed com pliance with all o f  the notice provisions.
124S herifi Dickens (Judicial District of Frederic ton) indicated that of the 80% of sales in which the m ortgagee 
is the sole b idder, the  usual sale price hovers a ro u n d  $500; Sheriff Wolfe (judicial District of M oncton) 
indicated that in 30% o f  the  cases the p roperties  were bid in at a very low figure; Sheriff Gillespie (Judicial 
District o f  Saint Jo h n ) estim ated of the  99% of sales in which the m ortgagee is the  sole b idder, the  usual 
sale price is a ro u n d  1 100; Sheriff H adley (judicial District of B athurst) estim ated o f  the 95% o f  sales in 
which the m ortgagee is the sole b idder, 10% of these sales are  for an am ount varying from  $500 to $1 ,000 
T h e  discrepancy as to  the percentage of m ortgages who buv in at a nom inal am ount in M oncton and 
B athurst is d u e  the  fact that the  general practice involves a m ortgagee buying in for an am ount equal to 
the  m ortgage debt.
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viewed as “frau d u len t” and could be disputed on the basis of a failure to 
act in good fa ith .125 W hether o r not a m ortgagee is under a duty to take 
reasonable precautions, is irre levant.126 T o  m aintain that the Property Act 
dictates the standard  o f care required  o f a liquidating cred itor and that 
s.44 should be viewed as an exculpatory clause should at most strain the 
patience o f a court. T o  sanction such a sale is to establish a rule o f law that 
a m ortgagee is perm itted  not only to keep property , which had been taken 
as security, but as well, to sue on the covenant for virtually the full am ount 
o f the ou tstanding debt. In effect, it would am ount to an o rd e r for fore­
closure absolute coupled with a right to sue on the covenant without the 
creditor having to reconvey the property; a feat which is not perm itted 
when foreclosure proceedings are taken un d er the watchf ul eyes o f equity 
judges.127 In o ther words, a court of equity will not perm it a m ortgagee “to 
have its cake and  eat it too!” T h e  legal phrase used to describe this p re­
dicam ent is “unjust enrichm ent”.
T h e  general practice o f buying in at a nom inal am ount seems to be 
tem pered  at times by the practice o f buying in for the am ount o f the 
m ortgage d eb t.128 So too can this practice be criticized on the ground that 
while the debt may be extinguished, thus precluding any subsequent de­
ficiency action, the value o f the property  may have exceeded the am ount 
o f the indebtedness.129 T h e  m ortgagee may still find itself in the position 
of having to defend  the sale for having sacrificed the m ortgagor's equity 
in the property.
T he  third approach would not appear to be wide spread but does 
deserve consideration. T o  buy in property  for its fair or forced m arket 
value would seem to obviate the need to take reasonable precautions on 
the g round that no one can complain that a sale at an undervalue has taken 
place. T h e  interests o f  the m ortgagor or ow ner o f the equity o f redem ption, 
subsequent m ortgagees, or judgm ent creditors with a registered claim, are 
all protected. Should a deficiency still exist, then an action on the covenant 
is justified, the debt not having been extinguished. Yet this approach is not 
without its limitations. T he  problem  is really of a three-fold nature; can a 
valid distinction be m ade between a fair as opposed to a forced market 
value; if so, what is the cause of this discrepancy and what empirical evi­
dence is there upon which one can arrive at two distinct valuations.
l2iT h e  w riter is m aking (he fundam ental assum ption  that the  value of the  property greatly exceeds S 1.000 . 
l2,,See text, supra, com m encing with footnote 4t>.
’- T h e  right of a m ortgagee to sue on the  covenant for a deficiency a fte r exercising the  pow er of sale o r 
a fte r a sale in foreclosure proceedings stem s from  the fact that the  m ortgagee has to account for any 
su rp lus generated  by the sale. If the  m ortgagee obtains an o rd e r for foreclosure absolute, he has elected 
to take the security in satisfaction of the debt and  cannot sue on  the  covenant unless he is in a position to 
reconvey the  land; see supra, footnote 5.
1-11Supra, footnote 124.
'•''(■f Frost Ltd. v. Ralph et al, supra, footnote  57. w here the m ortgage sold for just enough  to cover its debt 
and  the  am ount of the first m ortgage.
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T h e  decision of the New Brunswick C ourt of Appeal in the Haley case 
clearly holds that the secured creditor is only accountable for the dif ference 
between the am ount obtained and the am ount that would have been ob­
tained but for the failure to take reasonable precautions o r having acted 
negligently in their perform ance; that is, the forced m arket value less the 
sale price. T h e  court was satisfied that the property  could only be sold for 
an am ount between 60% and 75% o f its fair m arket value. T h e  distinction 
would appear to lie on the understand ing  that fair m arket value is the 
price which property  will fetch in the open m arket between a willing buyer 
and a willing seller bargaining on an equal footing and with the same 
know ledge.130 A forced m arket value is determ ined  in the context that the 
vendor is unwilling, a factor known by potential purchasers, and on the 
basis that the property  must be sold within a limited time frame.
T he  negative impact on the realizable price which such phrases as 
“M ortgage Sale”, B ankruptcy Sale”, “Sale by Receiver” or even “Estate Sale" 
have, are all too evident even to the most unsophisticated purchaser. I hey 
are indicia that a bargain is to be had. T he  psychological impact with respect 
to the price which a potential purchaser will pay for property, when it is 
known that a sale is a forced one, is dif ficult if not impossible to ascertain 
and one which in any event may be unavoidable. However, should the 
difference in values arise because o f the m arketing techniques employed 
in a forced sale setting being d ifferen t from  those in a norm al sale, then 
the discrepancy cannot be justified. T h e  difference, if any, should arise 
because in a forced sale situation there is a point in time at which the 
property  has to be sold after allowing for an appropria te  am ount o f time 
to m arket the property . In norm al sales the vendor usually has the discre­
tion to prevent a sale at what he considers an undervalue.131 T he  difference 
can be m inimized ;f secured creditors were to adopt the stance that not­
w ithstanding the fact that the sale is a forced one, the property will not be 
sacrificed so as to benefit “bargain hu n ters”. T he  m ore a forced sale re­
sembles a sale at “fair m arket value" the higher the probability that the 
best price will be obtained. A ‘fair m arket value” is, in tru th , only an estimate 
m ade on the assum ption that reasonable precautions will be taken to expose 
the property  to the greatest num ber o f  individuals in any one market.
Appraisal theory does not exist in a vacuum and accordingly any es­
timate as to value has to involve a m ethod of calculation, i.e., concrete data 
upon which an estim ate can be made. They are limited to three: the “m arket
lwO th er than  in the  a rea  o f  exprop ria tion  law, appraisal theory has fo r ihe most part been ignored  when 
discussing the am oun t fo r which a m ortgagee is to be held accountable: e.g., the Cuckmert case in which 
the issue as to qu an tu m  was avoided bv rem itting  the case to the trial judge for consideration. As for a 
com prehensive guide to defin ing  the phrase  “fair m arket value" see E.C.F. Todd, The l.aw of Expropriation  
in C anada, (T oron to : Carswell. 1976) at 119 et seq. For a tho rough  analyses of real estate appraisal theory, 
reference should be m ade to P.F. W endt, Real Estate A ppraisal Review and  O utlook (University of Georgia 
Press: 1974).
l5lEven in the open  m arket, there  will be instances w here a "willing vendor" is u n d er com pulsion to sell; 
r.g.. a change in job location. In  setting the fair m arket value, it is doub tfu l thai appraisers take this factor 
into account.
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com parison” o r “m arket d ata” approach; the “replacem ent cost” approach 
and; the “income investm ent o r economic” approach. For the purposes o f 
discussion and simplicity, assum e that the property  to be sold at a forced 
sale is a single family dwelling. In these circum stances the m arket data 
approach is the m ore appropriate  m ethod upon which to base an appraisal 
as to fair m arket value.1S¿ Reference to actual sales o f a com parable property 
will hopefully be available although adjustm ents will be made in light of 
the physical condition and location o f the property , etc. T u rn in g  to an 
appraisal in which the estim ate as to value is m ade on the basis o f a forced 
sale, then one would presum e that it would be based on com parable p ro p ­
erties which have been sold in forced sale situations. Does such data exist? 
Hopefully resort would not be m ade to sales in which the m ortgagee is the 
purchaser at a nom inal am ount.
A m ortgagee who has bought in at a sale at “fair m arket value” might 
feel insulated from  attack for an im provident sale but there is always som e­
one who will advance ano ther opinion as to value.1"  T hose who might 
p refer to buy in at the forced m arket value may well find it extremely 
difficult, from  an evidentary standpoint, to adduce cogent evidence as to 
value. If it is not sufficient then a court may have to resort to fair m arket 
value.1*4 In the end, there is only one way in which a liquidating creditor 
can be assured that the best price was obtained and that the sale will be 
unsuccessfully assailed. It involves adherence to the principle that a m ort­
gagee should take reasonable precautions in selling the property, that is, 
to adopt reasonable m arketing techniques.
Abuse-Theory v. Practice
Putting aside a sale to the liquidating m ortgagee at tail o r torced 
m arket value, then within the theoretical fram ework outlined, the tact that 
many m ortgagees are buying in for a nom inal am ount o r to r an am ount 
just sufficient to cover the debt would lead one to conclude that these 
practices can be characterized as being oppressive it not an abuse o f a 
remedial right. If  this is so, then why is it that the court dockets and law 
reports are not replete o f cases brought by aggrieved m ortgagors and junior 
m ortgagees? A num ber o f  reasons may exist which could explain this phe­
nom enon. M ortgagors who are unable to meet their debt obligations are 
just as well unable to meet the cost of litigating an im provident sale or 
defending an action for a deficiency. Junior m ortgagees undoubtedly ad ­
here to the same unquestioned practices and may be willing to accept the
ls:iW here the p roperty  to be sold is com m ercial in na tu re , then  the incom e approach as a meth<xl of 
evaluation might be p re fe rred ; cf. Frost Ltd. v. Ralph et al, supra, footnote 64 and  see footnote 65; Wood v. 
Bank of Nova Scotia et al, supra, footnote 69.
[™E.g., Wood v. Bank of Nova Scotia el al, supra, ioo tno ie  69. w here the  trial judge concluded that on the 
basis o f expert opin ion , the la ir m arket value was $65,000. T h e  plaintiffs, however, en te red  in to  evidence 
two appraisals, one at $93,200 and  the  o th e r at $95,000.
1 Mf,/., Nova Scotia Savings is  Loan v. Mackenzie, supra, footnote 47.
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loss which arises from  such sales. More im portant, however, is the course 
o f action which a foreclosing m ortgagee takes afte r having bought in for 
a nom inal am ount o r for the am ount o f the debt. Presumably the m ortgagee 
in such circum stances will then make attem pts to sell the property  in the 
norm al com m ercial way unless the proerty is o f some special value to him. 
A fter effecting the second sale the state o f accounts as between interested 
parties will fall into one o f two categories. E ither the m ortgage debt will 
have been satisfied o r the sale price will be insufficient to cover the am ount 
o f the indebtedness.
If the sale falls into the first category, then m ortgagees may be content 
with the results and thus taking no fu rth e r action based on the first sale. 
However, in the event there is a surplus, are m ortgagees accounting to 
those who would have been entitled had reasonable precautions been taken 
in the first instance? If the price realized is insufficient to cover the debt 
then a m ortgagee may still be inclined to sue for a deficiency, particularly 
if there  is a guarantor. From a legal standpoint, the deficiency should be 
based on the price paid un d er th first sale. A dherence to a h igher standard  
o f care in effecting a sale u n d er the power would dictate that this is the 
p ro p e r approach in calculating a deficiency. On the o ther hand, given the 
present practice su rround ing  sales, principles o f justice would dictate that 
this am ount be determ ined  upon the price realized under the second sale.
If m ortgagees are proceeding in this m anner, then the decision o f Mr. 
Justice Angers in N ova Scotia Savings csf Loan v. M acKenzie is being followed, 
albeit indirectly.135 This approach may mollify the view that the sale prac­
tices in New Brunswick are oppressive but it is not to be taken as suggesting 
that it is an acceptable alternative to the obligation to take reasonable p re­
cautions in the first instance. N or does it detract from  the injustices which 
arise in the event a second sale yields a surplus, even though it may well 
be a rare  occurrence, unless o f course m ortgagees are accounting for the 
excess.
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
T he initial problem of proper characterization o f this particular debtor- 
cred itor relationship has been resolved. N otw ithstanding the fact that the 
m ortgagee's obligations are not identical to those o f a trustee, the debate 
as to w hether this cred itor is un d er an obligation to act merely in good 
faith o r in addition is u n d er a duty to take reasonable precautions when 
exercising its pow er o f  sale continues. While the weight o f judicial authority 
tips the scales o f justice in favour o f a h igher standard , the distinction 
between a m ortgagee who acts solely in good faith and one who as well 
takes reasonable precautions, is m ore illusionary than real.
IS5In effect the  m ortgagee is buying in fo r the purpose  ot reselling as was originally in tended  when the 
equivalent o f  p a rag rap h  44(1 )(a) o f  the  Property Art was hrst enacted in 1903.
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T h e  analysis o f  C anadian and English cases leads one to the conclusion 
that the debate has focused entirely on the appropriate  word form ulae to 
be utilized in denoting  the m ortgagee’s obligations and has not, for the 
most part, been directed at circum scribing the type o f conduct required o f 
this liquidating creditor. However, the resolution o f this issue should not 
depend  on the exam ination o f cases within a particular factual setting, but 
ra ther on the rationale which can be offered as a justification for requiring 
either a less stringent o r h igher duty o f care. Given that it is in the best 
interests o f  the m ortgagor, the liquidating m ortgagee and o ther interested 
parties that a h igher standard  o f care be im posed, then it is difficult to 
assail a rule o f law as expressed in the Haley case. T ruly , the issues today 
with respect to the pow er o f sale should center on the natu re o f the rea­
sonable precautions necessary in o rd e r to dispose o f property  at a fair 
price. In so doing, the problem  o f price inadequacy will have been ad­
dressed even though the am ount realized may not reflect its m arket value.
Against this theoretical background, the perceived general practice 
su rrounding  m ortgage sales in the Province o f New Brunswick leaves no 
doubt that m ere com pliance with the provisions o f  the Property Act affords 
no protection to e ither the debtor o r creditor. So far as the liquidating 
m ortgagee is concerned, to m aintain that the Property Act lays down a com­
plete code as to the conduct required  in selling the security is to ask a court 
to accept an in terp retation  which is at variance with the obligations which 
it has imposed and one in which it is doubtful that the legislature ever 
intended. T o  insist that certain provisions o f the Property Act should be 
in terp re ted  as exculpatory clauses is as well at variance with the imposed 
standard  and, in any event, is at odds with o ther provisions.
W hether or not the power o f sale as a m erns o f liquidating a debt is, 
in practice, being abused does not detract from  the fact that it is open to 
such abuse if m ortgagees are acting arbitrarily. T he  oppressive natu re of 
a sale in which the m ortgagee buys in for a nom inal am ount or one just 
sufficient to cover the debt can adm ittedly be tem pered by the m ortgagee 
suing for the deficiency on the basis o f  the second sale. But these approaches 
should not be viewed as acceptable alternatives to the duty to take reason­
able precautions in the first instance. As for creditors who wish to buy in 
at fair o r forced m arket value, they may well find themselves in the unen­
viable position of justif ying either sale price because of the failure to take 
reasonable precautions. T h ere  is only one m ethod which will ensure that 
all interested parties are  protected and in all cases; the adherence to p roper 
m arketing techniques when exercising the power.
T he  essence of any recom m endation seeking to clarify the obligations 
or duties o f a m ortgagee when exercising a power o f sale must lie in the 
acceptance that this cred itor should take reasonable precautions in dis­
posing o f his security. Legislative direction on this m atter would appear to 
be the most convenient and expedient way to proceed. M oreover, to rec­
om m end a statutory provision em bodying such a rule o f law is only the
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vertex in legislative reform . T h e  existing statutory provisions found in the 
Property Act are nearly identical to those first enacted in England in 1881l ,t’ 
and should be reassessed with a view to elim inating ambiguities and bring­
ing them  into line with the com m ercial realities o f  today. Legislative intent 
should not be m ade a m atter o f  speculation, nor should it be sacrificed for 
the sake o f clarity. N or should reform  occur solely in a theoretical or 
academic vacuum.
T h e problem s and issues which arise in an adversarial context can only 
be circum vented by a re-exam ination o f the en tire liquidation process by 
those familiar with its application. This group  is not to be restricted to 
secured creditors but as well should include, for example, those normally 
called upon to m arket property . T h e  expertise o f real estate agents should 
throw light on the p ro p e r precautions which can be deem ed reasonable 
when selling properties o f varying kinds. For example, there will be situ­
ations in which it is far m ore appropria te  to ef fect a sale by private contract 
o r by tender ra th e r than by public auction in o rd e r to obtain a just re turn . 
Similarly, the natu re  o f the property  may dictate that advertising on the 
national level, as well as on a local and a provincial level, is m ore app ro ­
priate. Even then, advertising should focus on the saleable features o f the 
property  and not solely on compliance with the Property Act. Admittedly 
such m atters may be incapable of codification but they are but a few of the 
many questions which can arise in the forced sale setting. In addition, one 
m ight ask w hether it is necessary to have m ore than one appraisal and if 
so, why? If  a reserve price is to be set, how is it to be determ ined? Is there 
a valid distinction between a fair as opposed to a forced m arket value? T he 
latter question is properly the dom ain 0 1 an appraiser.
In the end, legislative reform  should seek to provide the secured cred­
itor with a simple and efficient way in which to liquidate his debt while at 
the same time providing adequate protection to all interested parties, in­
cluding the creditor, with respect to obtaining the best price possible in the 
circum stances.137 T h e  resulting legislation should not seek to ef fect a com­
prom ise but ra th er to effect a process which can ensure iiic adequacy o f 
the price realized when property  is foreclosed upon un d er a power of sale.
l,7Supra, footnote 3 with respect to the  recom m endation  of the Civil P rocedure  Rules Revision C om m ittee.
li6Supra, footnote 104.
